就在泉州中級人民法院於10月判處緬北一個詐騙集團三名華裔主犯死刑之際，再有報道指一名華裔商人涉嫌捲入柬埔寨詐騙犯罪。這些事件引出一個核心議題：亞洲各國必須強化合作，共同打擊詐騙犯罪。
這類犯罪往往伴隨人口走私、綁架、販毒、強迫賣淫、非法賭場、網上賭博、侵害人權、殺害園區員工，以及盜取多國受害者私人財產等其他犯罪行為。
2026年10月13日，泉州市中級人民法院判處魏氏家族三名成員──魏煥仁、陳大偉、廖靜芳死刑。該團夥組織實施詐騙活動，受害人眾多，涉案金額逾122億元。詐騙集團另外三名成員魏清濤、康敏、熊恆星被判處無期徒刑，其餘55名組織者分別被判處3年3個月至24年有期徒刑。
中國公民被誘騙剝削
魏氏家族是緬北「政、軍、商犯罪三角關係」的四大華裔家族之一。該家族經營14個詐騙園區，透過虛假高薪承諾，誘騙大量中國內地華人前往緬北工作。
受害者被誘騙進入緬甸境內後，隨即遭到綁架、酷刑，被迫在詐騙園區勞動。魏氏家族核心成員如同剝削型企業家，以鐵鏈、刑具懲罰業績不佳或反抗的員工。中緬警方聯合搗毀該家族詐騙園區時，現場發現頭骨留有槍彈創傷的受害者。至少兩名中國公民遭魏氏家族殺害。
自2024年起，中國公安部與緬甸當局緊密合作打擊跨境詐騙。僅2025年，就有7600名涉嫌網賭、電訊詐騙的中國公民，從緬甸妙瓦底被移交回中國內地。
魏氏家族案宣判的9個月前，中國已經處決果敢老街另一個深度捲入跨境詐騙的明氏家族11名核心成員。魏氏家族主犯獲刑，體現中國打擊詐騙、嚴懲華裔詐騙組織者的堅定政治決心。
作為魏氏家族的核心成員，陳大偉竟肆意動用其掌控的武裝安保力量濫殺無辜，導致兩名中國公民不幸殞命。在央視大型紀錄片《緬北電詐覆滅紀實》中，當鏡頭對準他、追問其在殘酷的祭祀儀式中殺人時內心作何感想時，他竟冷血地吐出一句「沒有感覺」。
談及對跨境詐騙集團華裔頭目的判決，中國政法大學霍政欣教授指出，此案的依法審理精準契合了《刑法》第8條的法律應用場景，充分展現了中國刑法打擊跨境犯罪、維護法治正義的強大震懾力。
管轄權與域外適用
《刑法》第8條規定：「外國人在中華人民共和國領域外對中華人民共和國國家或者公民犯罪，而按本法規定的最低刑為3年以上有期徒刑的，可以適用本法，但是按照犯罪地的法律不受處罰的除外。」。這條文的含義是：即使部分詐騙組織者已經取得外國國籍，中國仍然可以依據《刑法》第8條追究刑責。
除此之外，《刑法》第7條規定：「中華人民共和國公民在中華人民共和國領域外犯本法規定之罪的，適用本法」。因此，華裔人士在中國境外組織詐騙集團、實施電詐相關犯罪，中國可依中國法律予以懲處。
霍政欣教授評論：「保護管轄權也是國際法上普遍認可的管轄依據」；《環球時報》則強調「緬北電詐案件是中國刑法域外適用的典型案例」。
紀錄片《緬北電詐覆滅紀實》提到，在向緬甸引渡華裔詐騙頭目、允許中國警方進入老街詐騙園區取證的過程中，緬甸方面曾顧慮跨境取證的法律問題。
經過磋商，中緬警方達成共識，允許中國警方在詐騙園區內數小時開展證據收集工作。大量詐騙嫌犯與受害者從緬北移交中國，不僅是跨境引渡的成果，更是中緬警方聯手打擊跨境詐騙合作的重大成功。
近期對華裔詐騙頭目的刑罰，具備重大政治意義。正如霍政欣教授所言，中國致力保護本國公民在境內外的人身安全與財產權利，同時對跨國有組織犯罪形成強大震懾。
官黑共生關係與受害者
魏氏家族詐騙產業揭示兩大核心特徵：政罪共生，以及受害者被商品化。家族第一代魏超仁，2009年捲入果敢地方權力鬥爭，與彭家聲對抗，從而鞏固自身勢力根基。
自那以後，緬甸軍政府默許魏超仁家族勢力坐大。最關鍵是其弟魏懷仁，透過掌控果敢邊防營1006部隊擴張權力。魏超仁提拔親族搭建營運架構，魏清濤出任邊防部隊監委成員，並培養侄兒陳大偉成為家族軍事繼承人、安保總指揮。陳大偉獲授權管轄邊防武裝，把維護地方安全的公權力，轉化為家族詐騙產業牟利工具。魏氏家族案例完整展示：家族將武裝力量與犯罪商業活動融合，建立官黑共生的體系，藉此營運詐騙帝國。
受害者商品化，指魏氏集團透過網路誘騙內地人越過雲南邊境，到老街充當現代奴隸，同時騙取受害者財產。報道指魏氏家族把被綁架拘禁的中國人當成商品，每一名被俘者都要向內地親屬勒索不少於30萬元贖金。贖金、敲詐、非法賭場、網絡詐騙為魏家帶來巨額收益。整個詐騙產業形成惡性循環：家族核心成員一心逐利，完全漠視人權、人格尊嚴、商業倫理與道德規範。
為偵辦該跨境詐騙集團，中國警方曾三次跨越雲南邊境赴境外取證，期間須走訪國內28個省份、240座城市，全面蒐集魏氏家族的犯罪證據。緬北當地武裝叛勢長期與緬甸中央軍交戰，令整個跨境取證工作時刻面臨武裝衝突的重大風險。
央視這套緬北華裔四大家族紀錄片提到，中國警方曾三度接觸這四大家族，給予他們停止損害中國公民利益非法業務的機會，但四大家族毫無收斂。評論者認為四大家族沒有珍惜中方釋放的善意，中方最後只能徹底剷除這股勢力。
網絡擴張與區域調查
內地官媒公布魏氏核心頭目判決消息之際，半島電視台剛好發布調查影片，指湖南出身的柬埔寨華裔商人鄧丕兵涉嫌在柬埔寨長灣項目內經營詐騙業務。柬埔寨反網絡詐騙委員會主席謝西納里斯表示，柬埔寨當局現正調查長灣疑似網絡犯罪活動，據報鄧丕兵已被要求離開柬埔寨。
據半島電視台報道顯示，長灣開發項目牽涉多方，包括鄧丕兵與一名柬埔寨國家侍衛隊官員。鄧丕兵出生於湖南，2006年赴柬埔寨，2016年入籍柬埔寨，其商業活動在2023年引發爭議，旗下正恒集團被英國政府制裁，指控涉及強迫勞動。
值得留意，多名華裔商人涉嫌捲入詐騙相關活動。除了老街四大家族核心成員，還有柬埔寨太子集團陳志。陳志是柬埔寨跨境詐騙集團首腦，2026年1月從柬埔寨引渡回中國。
太子集團本身是跨國企業，在柬埔寨投資度假村、酒店與多個開發項目。集團透過虛假招聘廣告誘騙華人勞工，虐待並強迫他們在詐騙園區工作；詐騙所得透過加密貨幣洗錢、資金轉移，再投入產業擴張。
中國政府打擊跨境詐騙犯罪的政治決心堅定。警方與緬甸、柬埔寨、泰國當局的合作取得成效，把損害中國公民與國家利益的海外華裔商人繩之以法。
打擊跨境詐騙的障礙，根源在東南亞各國內部複雜政治環境。緬甸中央政府管治能力偏弱，軍方難以全面控制邊境地區，叛軍活躍；詐騙集團趁地方行政權力真空興建園區，加害中國及其他國家民眾。
國家管治能力、流動性與前路展望
在中國、美國等多國施壓之下，柬埔寨政府決心打擊國內腐敗、清剿詐騙園區，但要破除政罪共生關係、部分貪官與不法商人之間千絲萬縷的關係，難度極高。2025年12月柬泰邊境衝突期間，有報道指泰軍針對四座邊境賭場及附屬網詐園區採取行動，背後顧慮是這些場地會被改造為柬埔寨軍事據點。當時估計約有10萬人在柬埔寨詐騙中心工作。
聯合國毒品和犯罪問題辦公室資料顯示，截至2026年2月，大約30萬人被困在東南亞各地詐騙中心。近期報道指出，詐騙產業已經向外擴散至非洲國家，包括尼日利亞、加納。打擊跨境詐騙最根本阻礙：詐騙集團頭目流動性極強，會把產業轉移到中央政府控制力薄弱、官員腐敗，當地貧困民眾容易被暴利吸引、願意跨境到詐騙園區工作的國家。
總結而言，打擊跨境網絡詐騙是一項迫切的全球性任務，不只需要跨國警務合作、引渡機制，更需要各國內部反腐與治罪的決心。中國已經大力強化本國公民出入境管理，懲罰在海外開設詐騙園區的華商與公民，並透過外交途徑引渡犯罪嫌疑人回國受審。從結構層面看，緬甸與柬埔寨中央政府管治能力不足，是區域打擊跨境詐騙的重大挑戰。
透過中柬、中緬警務合作，柬埔寨與緬甸中央政府提升打擊跨境詐騙集團與園區的管治能力。柬埔寨國會2026年3月通過新法，詐騙營運者最高可判30年監禁或終身監禁。不過柬埔寨仍需要持續深化、擴大反腐與打擊犯罪運動。
緬甸詐騙情況雖然略有好轉，但中央軍方與地方軍閥能否持續聯手打擊詐騙，仍有待觀察。期待東盟等區域組織日後提升角色，維持區域聯合打擊跨境詐騙的勢頭。亞洲各國亦要開展宣傳教育，讓一般民眾認識網絡詐騙的風險，並讓商界明白詐騙相關罪行的嚴重刑罰。
The politics of combatting cross-border scam crime in Southeast Asia
While three ethnic Chinese organizers of a scam syndicate in northern Myanmar were sentenced by the Quanzhou Intermediate People’s Court in October to death, a new report concerning an ethnic Chinese businessman’s alleged involvement in Cambodia’s scam crime has emerged. These reports have raised a critical issue of how countries in Asia must strengthen their cooperation in their joint combat against scam crime, which embraces other types of criminal activities such as human smuggling, kidnapping, drugs trafficking, forced prostitution, illegal casinos, online gambling, human rights abuses, the murder of employees, and the theft of the private properties of victims in different countries.
On October 13, 2026, the Quanzhou Intermediate People’s Court sentenced three members of the Wei family – Wei Huanren, Chen Dawei and Liao Jingfang – to death for their involvement and organization of scam activities that victimized many people and netted more than 12.2 billion yuan (The Standard, October 13, 2026). Another three members of the scam syndicates – Wei Qingtao, Kang Min and Xiong Hengxing – were handed life sentences and fifty-five more organizers were imprisoned from three years and three months to twenty-four years (South China Morning Post, October 13, 2026).
The Wei family belonged to one of the four ethnic Chinese families that generated a triangular relationship between “political, military, and business criminal activities” in northern Myanmar (The Hong Kong Standard, October 13, 2026). It operated fourteen scam compounds and cheated many ethnic Chinese from the Chinese Mainland to work in northern Myanmar through the empty and fake promise of giving them “high” wages.
After the victims were lured into the Myanmar territory, they were kidnapped, tortured, and forced to work in scam compounds, while core family members functioned as exploitative “entrepreneurs” and punished “underperforming” workers and resistant employees by using iron chains and torture tools. The Chinese and Myanmar police collaborated in their crackdown of the family’s scam compound, and they found victims with bullet holes in their skulls. At least two ethnic Chinese citizens were killed by the Wei clan (Independent, October 14, 2026).
The Chinese government’s Ministry of Public Security has been working closely with the Myanmar authorities since 2024 to combat cross-border scam crime. In 2025 alone, 7,600 Chinese citizens, who were suspected of being involved in online gambling and telecom scams, were extradited from Myanmar’s Myawaddy to the Chinese Mainland (Independent, October 14, 2026).
Nine months prior to the sentencing of the Wei clan members, China executed eleven members of another family – the Ming clan – which had been deeply involved in cross-border scam crime in the city of Laukkai in Kokang (BBC News, January 29, 2026). The sentencing of the core members of the Wei family showed that China has a strong political will to fight against scam crime and to severely punish those ethnic Chinese scam organizers.
Chen Dawei, one of the core members of the Wei family, used the armed security force under his control to kill people indiscriminately, leading to the death of two Chinese citizens (Global Times, October 13, 2026). The CCTV documentary, namely The Demise of Myanmar-based Telecom Fraud, showed that when Chen was asked how he felt when people were killed in a ritual sacrifice to heaven, he even replied that he “felt nothing” (Global Times, October 13, 2026).
The execution of ethnic Chinese who were involved in cross-border scam syndicates illustrated the phenomenon that, according to Professor Huo Zhengxin at the Chinese University of Political Science and Law, Article 8 of the Chinese Criminal Law was applied in punishing unethical Chinese scam organizers (Global Times, October 13, 2026).
Jurisdiction and extraterritorial application
Article 8 stipulates that the Chinese Criminal Law “may be applicable to any foreigner who commits a crime outside the territory and territorial waters and space of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) against the state of the PRC or against any of its citizens,” provided that the minimum penalty for the offense is a fixed-term prison sentence of at least three years, and that the offense is also punishable under the law of the place where the offense was committed (See: Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China). The implication is that even if some Chinese scam organizers have foreign citizenship, China can punish them by using Article 8 of the Criminal Law.
Furthermore, Article 7 of the Chinese Criminal Law states that this law “shall be applicable to any citizen of the PRC who commits a crime prescribed in this law outside the territory and territorial waters and space of the PRC” (See: Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China). As such, for ethnic Chinese who have organized scam syndicates and committed scam-related crime in countries outside the PRC, they can be punished under the Chinese law.
Professor Huo commented that “protective jurisdiction is also a widely recognized basis for jurisdiction under international law” (Global Times, October 13, 2026), while Global Times stressed that the “Myanmar-based telecom fraud cases serve as a typical example of the extraterritorial application of China’s criminal law” (Global Times, October 13, 2026).
A documentary, which was entitled The Demise of Myanmar-based Telecom Fraud, mentioned that in the process of seeking to extradite the ethnic Chinese scam organizers from Myanmar to China and to allow Chinese police to gather evidence in the scam compounds in Laukkai, the Myanmar authorities were concerned about the question of cross-border evidence collection.
However, after negotiation, the Myanmar and Chinese police reached a consensus that the PRC police would be allowed to gather evidence in the scam compound within a few hours. The fact that many Chinese scam organizers and victims were returned from northern Myanmar to the PRC demonstrated not only the triumph of cross-border extradition but also the tremendous success of Sino-Myanmar police cooperation in their joint combat against cross-border scam crime.
The recent execution of ethnic Chinese scam organizers is politically significant. As Professor Huo said, China has made tremendous “efforts to protect the personal safety and property rights of its citizens both at home and abroad, while delivering a strong deterrent to transnational organized crime” (Global Times, October 13, 2026).
The political-criminal nexus and victim commodification
The Wei family’s scam operation illustrated two key features: the persistence of a political-criminal nexus and the commodification of Chinese victims. The family’s first generation included Wei Chaoren, who entrenched his power base by participating in the local politics of the Kokang region and struggling against his superior Peng Jiasheng in 2009.
Since then, the military junta in Myanmar tolerated the rise of Wei Chaoren and his clan. Most importantly, his brother Wei Huaren expanded his influence and power through the control of the Kokang Border Guard Force Battalion 1006 (The Irrawaddy, January 5, 2024; Bastille Post, October 13, 2026). Wei Chaoren promoted his relatives to organize his business, including Wei Qingtao who was a member of the supervisory committee of the Border Guard Force, while grooming his nephew Chen Dawei as the family’s military successor and security chief (Bastille Post, October 13, 2026. See: Ringleaders of northern Myanmar telecom fraud group sentenced to death). Chen was given the authority to supervise the boarder guard, turning the power of safeguarding state security to benefiting his family’s scam-related businesses. The case of the Wei clan fully demonstrated how the Wei clan merged its military power with entrepreneurial-type of criminal activities – a political-criminal nexus that was established and utilized to run the scam syndicate.
The commodification of victims included how the Chinese victims were deceived online by luring them to cross the border of the Yunnan province to work as modern slaves in Laukkai and by cheating their money. It was reported that the Wei clan treated the kidnapped and trapped Chinese citizens as commodities, with each individual asking mainland relatives a ransom of at least 300,000 yuan (Bastille Post, October 13, 2026). Ransom payment, extortion, illicit casinos, and online scams brought about huge revenues to the Wei clan. The entire scam business operated in a vicious cycle that the core members of the Wei family were preoccupied with how to profit themselves with total disregard for human rights, human dignity, business ethics and moral values.
To fight cross-border scam syndicates, the PRC police crossed the Yunnan provincial border three times to collect evidence, ran the risks of being affected by armed struggles in northern Myanmar where rebel groups constantly fight against the central-level military, and travelled to twenty-eight mainland Chinese provinces and 240 cities to collect evidence on the criminal activities of the Wei clan (Bastille Post, October 13, 2026).
The CCTV documentary on the demise of the Myanmar-based Chinese families mentioned that the Chinese police actually contacted the four “big” Chinese families three times and gave them a chance to terminate their illicit operations detrimental to the interests of Chinese citizens in the Chinese Mainland, but the families did nothing. Critics of the four “big” families said that they failed to appreciate the already generous gestures and offer from the Chinese police, which then had no choice but to destroy them.
Expanding networks and regional investigations
When the official punishment of the core leaders of the Wei clan was announced by the mainland Chinese media, Aljazeera coincidentally released a video that had investigated the involvement of a Chinese Cambodian businessman, Deng Pibing, in Cambodia’s Long Bay development where scam business was allegedly operating (See: Deng Pibing Left Cambodia in May as Authorities Probe Long Bay Development | Kiripost). The Cambodian authorities are now investigating the suspected cybercrime-related activities in Long Bay, and Deng was reportedly asked to leave Cambodia, according to Chhay Sinarith, the Head of the Commission for Combating Online Scam (Kiri Post, October 13, 2026. See: Deng Pibing Left Cambodia in May as Authorities Probe Long Bay Development | Kiripost). The Aljazeera report showed that some key parties were involved in the Long Bay development, including Deng and also a Cambodian national bodyguard official. Born in Hunan province and arriving at Cambodia in 2006, Deng acquired Cambodian citizenship in 2016, but his business activities appeared to be controversial in 2023 when his ZhengHeng Group was sanctioned by the UK government as being involved in forced labour (The Epoch Times, October 13, 2026. See: 柬埔寨華商鄧丕兵旗下電詐園區黑幕曝光 | 大紀元. Also see: Notice_Global_Human_Rights_081223.pdf).
It is noteworthy that some ethnic Chinese businesspeople were allegedly involved in scam-related activities, including the core members of four Chinese families in Laukkai to Chen Zhi of the Prince Group. Chen was the ringleader of a cross-border scam syndicate in Cambodia, and he was extradited from Cambodia to China in January 2026.
The Prince Group operated as a multinational business corporation with investment in resorts, hotels and other developmental projects in Cambodia. Nevertheless, the group lured Chinese workers again with fake job advertisement, tortured them and forced them to work in scam compounds, where proceeds were reinvested and transferred through cryptocurrency and money laundering (Global Times, October 7, 2026. See: Documentary discloses the moments when hoods removed after ringleader and key members of major cross-border gambling and fraud criminal syndicate escorted back to China – Global Times).
The PRC government and authorities have the strong political will to combat all cases of cross-border scam crime. Its police cooperation with the authorities in Myanmar, Cambodia and Thailand has yielded positive results, bringing those ethnic Chinese businesspeople, whose operations harm the interests of the Chinese citizen and PRC state, into justice.
The obstacles to combat cross-border scam crime involve the domestic political complexities in Southeast Asian countries. Myanmar remains a relatively weak state at the central government level where the military cannot easily control all the border regions, where rebel groups are active, and where scam operators often seize the political-administrative vacuum to build their compounds and victimize peoples from China and many other countries.
State capacity, mobility, and the path forward
Although the Cambodian government, under the pressure from China and the US and other countries, is determined to fight internal corruption and eliminate scam compounds, it encounters a huge challenge of curbing the political-criminal nexus and the allegedly close relations between some corrupt officials and unethical businesspeople. During the December 2025 border conflicts between Cambodia and Thailand, it was reported that the Thai military targeted four border casinos and affiliated online scam compounds, and that its attack was due to the concern about whether these casinos would be converted into Cambodian military bases (The Strait Times, December 19, 2025). At that time, an estimated 100,000 people were involved in the operation of scam centres in Cambodia.
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in February 2026 about 300,000 people were trapped in scam centres in Southeast Asia (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commission, February 20, 2026). Recent reports have indicated that scam operations have been spreading to bases that were established in African countries, including Nigeria and Ghana (Independent, October 13, 2026). The ultimate obstacle to the fight against cross-border scam crime is that its syndicates and leaders are extremely mobile, moving their operations to countries where local states remain weak, where the central government cannot easily control localities, where local officials are corrupt, and where less well-off citizens from other countries can be easily attracted by lucrative profits to cross national border to work in scam compounds.
In conclusion, the fight against cross-border online scams is an urgent global task that requires not only cross-border police cooperation, but also extradition and domestic determination to fight crime and corruption. China has already made strenuous efforts at tightening the entry and exit regulations of Chinese citizens, punishing those overseas Chinese businesspeople and citizens who operate scam compounds, and utilizing diplomatic means to have Chinese criminal suspects extradited for trial in the Chinese Mainland. Structurally speaking, the weak central-level state in Myanmar and Cambodia appear to be a huge challenge in the regional fight against cross-border scam crime.
Through Sino-Cambodian and Sino-Myanmar police cooperation, the central state in Cambodia and Myanmar can be strengthened in their state capacity of combatting cross-border scam syndicates and compounds. The Cambodian National Assembly in March 2026 passed a law to punish scam operators by imposing either thirty years of jail or life imprisonment on them. Still, anti-corruption and anti-crime campaigns will have to be deepened and broadened in Cambodia.
The scam situation in Myanmar has improved slightly, but it remains to be seen whether the central state and local warlords will collaborate in the joint combat against scam crime. It is hoped that regional organizations like ASEAN will soon strengthen their role and sustain the momentum in the joint effort at fighting against cross-border scam crime in the coming years. Countries in Asia must also launch a collective educative campaign to educate ordinary citizens about the dangers of online scam, and to educate their businesspeople about the heavy penalties on scam-related crime.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。（原文按此）
