從美國總統特朗普與中國國家主席習近平通電話的報道來看，通話不僅持續了90分鐘，討論的議題也十分突出。
首先，這次通電話顯然是由特朗普先邀約的，這表明美國總統深明給予中國領導人面子的重要。特朗普視習近平為朋友，相信兩人的私交有助兩國外交的進展。
其次，在此次通話之前，特朗普曾稱中方在談判中非常強硬，暗示中國當局對稀土出口的限制已經損害了美國汽車行業利益。事實上，中國已經控制了稀土的供應鏈和出口，而這是一種製造汽車至關重要的戰略材料。中國採取的談判策略似乎非常有效，很可能不會在對美稀土出口問題上輕易讓步。
特朗普歡迎中國留學生
第三，特朗普在通話後表示，美國將繼續歡迎中國大陸學生赴美留學。在特朗普政府與美國頂尖學府圍繞國際學生招生問題博弈之際，特朗普的言論似乎是在與習近平通話時，向中方作一次小讓步。
第四，美中元首通話是5月初雙方在日內瓦就對等關稅水平相互讓步後首度進行，這為兩國後續的貿易談判敲開了大門。
第五，據悉習近平已邀請特朗普總統夫婦訪華。這是一個重要的姿態和外交舉措。若然特朗普出席2025年11月於南韓舉行的APEC會議，屆時便有可能順道訪問北京。
第六，中國堅持美國應妥善處理台灣問題，不應支持台獨運動。對此，特朗普重申美國堅持一個中國政策。由於特朗普傾向於運用交易外交來處理國際關係，因此特朗普在其第二任期內，會就台灣的政治前途與中方討價還價也就不足為奇了。
台灣或失去台積電為談判籌碼
特朗普政府在政治上仍然支持台灣，但台積電最近決定在亞利桑那州建廠，引發了一個問題：台灣是否會失去台積電作為與中國政府談判的籌碼。
特朗普及其台灣高層決策者毋疑希望維持台灣現狀，以換取北京採取相對不干預的方式處理台灣問題。
如此一來，中美雙方在一些關鍵議題上都有很大的談判潛力。如果台灣迫於美國的壓力而不得不接受九二共識，那麼美國很可能會要求中國也必須採取和平方式處理兩岸關係。
換句話說，在特朗普的交易外交政策下，美方可能會要求中國大陸讓步，例如或許可以對一國兩制的台灣模式進行更自由的改革，賦予台灣比香港更大的自治權。按照中國大陸目前提出一國兩制的台灣模式，台灣將能夠開展國際關係，並在政治、立法和司法領域享有自治。
美向台軍售涉國家安全議題
可以預見，中美將就如何允許台灣維持自己的軍隊，以及台灣在多大程度上繼續購買美國軍事武器進行談判，從中、台和美三方而言，這都是一個國家安全議題。
在特朗普的交易外交策略下，美方很可能利用台灣的政治前途迫使北京讓步，以換取對台灣的安全保障。在中美元首通話的五天前，美國國防部長赫格塞斯在新加坡香格里拉安全對話會上公開表示，中國正準備在2027年前對台灣發動攻擊，並警告中方不要軍事冒險。
總而言之，特朗普與習近平的通話可以說是美國外交的挫折。美國原本奉行「咪高峰外交」，如今意識到透過促成特朗普與習近平的通話來給中方面子的重要。在整個外交爭端中，包括特朗普政府突然加徵對等關稅、對中國留學生突然拒絕批出入境簽證，以及赫格塞斯公開批評中國2027年攻台計劃，面對美方種種消極舉措，中國由始至終一直保持着相對耐心。
同時，中國在稀土出口問題上一直採取相對低調的立場，控制其規模和速度，同時監控整個供應鏈，以維護中國國家安全。鑑於稀土對美國汽車生產的戰略重要性，以及需要與中國持續接觸並同時遏制其崛起，特朗普政府決定與中方通話。
中美之間這種不斷變化的態勢反映了現代地緣政治更廣泛的複雜性，即經濟利益、意識形態承諾和區域安全關切交織在一起。對兩國而言，台灣的地位不僅象徵各自對全球治理的不同看法，也成為各自國內議程的試金石。
從某種意義上說，在美國「咪高峰外交」的背景下，特朗普政府已經意識到繼續與中國對話的務實需求。美國領導人必須理解面子在中國外交中的重要。中美元首會談突顯了他理解這個文化層面的必要性。在特朗普的交易型策略下，關稅、貿易和台灣等問題都可以談判。如果中國邀請特朗普訪問北京，預計美方會把面子還給習近平主席。
The Trump-Xi dialogue and its long-term implications for transactional diplomacy
The most recent telephone discussion between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping is a testimony that while both Washington and Beijing are adopting a pragmatic approach to resolving their trade and tariff disputes, a more intensive bargaining process is looming until November 2025, when the APEC meeting will be held in South Korea, where Trump will not only have a window of opportunity to meet Xi but also visit China the second time after his first visit in November 2017.
Judging from the reports on the Trump-Xi telephone dialogue, several matters were prominent in their discussions, which lasted for ninety minutes.
First, the telephone dialogue was apparently triggered by Trump’s invitation, showing that the top US leaders understood the importance of giving “face” to the Chinese counterparts rather than harping on the same theme of using megaphone diplomacy to criticise the Chinese authorities and position. Trump regards Xi as his friend, and as such, personal connections between the two have helped both countries to move forward diplomatically, although the Trump administration has been adopting the America First foreign policy.
Second, before the phone call, Trump had referred to the Chinese side as “very tough” in negotiations, implying that the Chinese authorities have restricted the exports of rare earth to the extent of undermining the interest of the US automobile industry. In fact, China has controlled the supply chain and exports of rare earth, a precious and strategic material essential for the production and quality of automobiles. This Chinese bargaining strategy has appeared to be very effective, forcing the US side to push for a telephone discussion between President Trump and President Xi. Although both sides appeared to touch on the Chinese exports of rare earth, China will likely retain its control over the scope and speed of such exports, because such control will remain the most useful and influential bargaining chip vis-à-vis the US.
The Chinese bargaining strategy of retaining its control over the export of rare earth magnets is arguably the most important one forcing the US side to keep its dialogue with China. If strategic ambiguity is an effective strategy in diplomatic politics, it is likely that China will not make concessions easily and rapidly on the export of rare earth to the US.
Third, Trump said after the telephone dialogue that the US would continue to welcome mainland Chinese students to study in the US. Amid the struggles between the Trump administration and the top American universities over the admission of international students, Trump’s remarks appeared to be a minor US concession to China during his phone discussions with Xi. In a sense, the Chinese side’s criticism of the Trump administration’s suddenly tightened policy toward foreign students, including Mainland Chinese students, was effective and exerted pressure on the US side to make concessions.
Third, a key point discussed during the Trump-Xi call was China’s strategic control over rare earth exports, which continue to serve as a vital leverage in the ongoing trade negotiations. Rare earth materials are indispensable for the US automotive industry, and China’s ability to dictate their availability highlights the asymmetry in bargaining power. This issue underscores the broader economic tensions that both leaders aim to address, albeit through cautious and calculated measures. Trump’s acknowledgement of China’s “very tough” negotiation stance reflects the gravity of this challenge, as the US seeks ways to mitigate the impact on its industries while maintaining dialogue with Beijing.
Fourth, the Trump-Xi call was made after both sides had already made mutual concessions on the percentages of reciprocal tariffs in Geneva in early May, and it opens the door for both sides to continue their trade negotiations later. As such, the US-China dialogue is kept open, serving as a crucial breakthrough amid the megaphone diplomacy adopted by the US and followed by China in recent weeks.
Fifth, it is reported that President Xi invites President Trump and his wife to visit China – an important gesture and diplomatic move that will not only calm down US megaphone diplomacy toward China but also pave the way for the possibility of the second Trump visit to Beijing. If Trump will likely visit South Korea in November 2025 when APEC will be held there, Trump’s visit to Beijing after his attendance in the APEC meeting will be a realistic possibility – a situation depending on the progress of US-China relations.
Sixth, all the news reports point to the Chinese insistence that the US should manage the Taiwan matter properly and that the US should not support the “Taiwan independence” movement. In response, Trump reiterated the US support for its adherence to the one-China policy. In this aspect, a careful reading of the Mainland Chinese position in the Sino-US negotiations throughout 2024 was that Beijing expressed its displeasure with the continuous US provision and sale of military weapons to Taiwan.
Donald Trump may consider adopting a transactional diplomatic approach to dealing with Taiwan, seemingly showing a less determined attitude to the provision of weapons to the Taiwan military authorities, although his rhetoric of supporting Taiwan ideologically and politically remains unchanged.
As Trump favours the use of transactional diplomacy in dealing with international relations, it would not be surprising that Trump and his subordinates would one day, at least during his second administration, bargain with Mainland China on the political future of Taiwan. The Trump administration remains politically supportive of Taiwan, but the recent decision of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) to establish its factory in Arizona raised the issue of whether Taiwan would likely lose TSMC as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis Mainland China. Even if TSMC retains its headquarters and core operations in Taiwan and diversifies its business to the US, its future and security in Taiwan will likely become a bargaining chip for both US and China to negotiate further.
As a business-type politician favouring political bargaining, President Trump and his top Taiwan policymakers would surely like to maintain Taiwan’s status quo in exchange for securing from Beijing a relatively hands-off approach to dealing with the island. If so, both China and the US will have great potential to bargain on some key issues. If Taiwan under the US pressure would have to accept the 1992 consensus (one-China principle is adopted, but the definition of one China is up to interpretations from Mainland and Taiwan sides), then the US would very likely demand that China must also adopt a peaceful approach to managing cross-strait relations.
In other words, under Trump’s transactional diplomacy, the Mainland Chinese side would likely be asked by the US side to make concessions, like perhaps the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” can be reformed in an even “more liberal” way as to grant much greater autonomy to the Taiwan side than Hong Kong. Under the current Mainland Chinese idea of the “Taiwan model of one country, two systems,” Taiwan would be able to conduct international relations and would enjoy autonomy in political, legislative and judicial spheres. It can be anticipated that the US and China would negotiate how Taiwan would be allowed to maintain its own military, and to what extent Taiwan would continue to buy US military weapons – a national security issue from the perspectives of Mainland China, Taiwan and the US.
Under Trump’s transactional diplomacy, the political future of Taiwan will likely be used by the US side to extract concessions from Beijing in exchange for security guarantees for Taiwan. Five days before Trump’s phone discussion with Xi, the US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth openly said in Singapore’s Shangri-la Security Dialogue that China is preparing a possible attack on Taiwan by 2027 – a remark that warned the Chinese side against such a plan. The Trump phone call to Xi a few days later appeared to suggest that while the US side must maintain its one-China policy, Washington is prepared to discuss with Beijing over the political future of Taiwan. If implicit political gestures are an indispensable element in US-China diplomacy, the open Hegseth remarks followed by the sudden Trump dialogue with Xi a few days later demonstrated that while the US side is perhaps floating the idea of negotiating with China over Taiwan, Beijing also does not exclude this possibility, but it must warn Washington of the danger of supporting “Taiwan independence.”
In conclusion, the Trump-Xi telephone dialogue arguably represents a diplomatic setback for the US, which originally adopted a megaphone diplomacy, and which has realised the importance of giving “face” to the Chinese side by triggering such phone discussions between Trump and Xi. China has remained relatively patient in the entire diplomatic row over the Trump administration’s sudden reciprocal tariffs, abrupt restrictions over international students that affect many Chinese students, and open criticisms levelled by Hegseth over China’s “plan” to “attack” Taiwan in 2027. All these US gestures and remarks, to the Chinese side, were originated from the Trump administration. At the same time, China has been adopting a relatively low-key approach to dealing with rare earth exports, controlling its scope and speed while monitoring the whole supply chains to protect the Chinese national security. In view of the strategic importance of rare earth to the production of vehicles in the US and considering the need to engage China continuously while simultaneously containing its rise, the Trump administration decided to trigger a phone dialogue with the Chinese side.
This evolving dynamic between the US and China reflects the broader complexities in modern geopolitics, where economic interests, ideological commitments, and regional security concerns intersect. For both nations, Taiwan’s status not only symbolises their competing visions of global governance but also serves as a touchstone for their respective domestic agendas. As transactional diplomacy unfolds, it will test the resilience of their longstanding principles and the adaptability of contemporary US-China diplomacy in addressing issues that carry profound implications for regional stability and global order.
In a sense, amid the US megaphone diplomacy, the Trump administration has already realised the pragmatic need to continue its dialogue with China. US leaders must grasp the importance of cherishing “face” in Chinese diplomacy. Trump’s discussion with President Xi highlighted his need to understand this cultural aspect. Under Trump’s transactional approach, issues like tariffs, trade, and Taiwan can all be negotiated. If China has extended its invitation to Trump to visit Beijing, the US side is expected to return its “face” to President Xi. Hence, it is crucial to observe the current development of US-China negotiations and dialogue leading up to the November 2025 APEC meeting, during which Trump will likely grasp the geographical proximity to fly from Seoul to Beijing, marking his second visit to China after the first trip in November 2017.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。（原文按此）
