Fri Jan 03 2025 23:59:59

跨境犯罪與引渡:佘智江案

佘智江引渡案為中泰跨境執法合作之重大成果。此案揭示不法商人、地方軍閥與貪腐官員結盟,於邊境形成結合詐騙、非法賭博與人口販運之犯罪飛地,對區域安全構成新型態威脅。
譯寫:羅耀強

昔日掌控緬甸妙瓦底詐騙園區的華商佘智江,其跌宕一生揭示了邊境犯罪飛地的興起,以及不法商人、地方軍閥與貪腐官員的共生亂象。隨着2025年11月他被引渡返國,這宗跨國詐騙不僅標誌着中泰聯手打擊跨境詐騙與非法賭博的重大成果,更為全球反詐敲響了警鐘。

佘智江生於湖南,14歲到廣西謀生,先後做過廚師、維修技工、保安、銷售。20歲時他前往菲律賓,透過向中國網民非法售賣彩票牟利,單靠這門生意賺得22億元。這門高收益生意,讓佘智江看見互聯網與跨境流動的巨大商機,並在往後事業中持續加以利用。

在東南亞的非法擴張

2015年,佘智江前往柬埔寨擴張業務。當時不少柬埔寨賭場目標客戶正是中國內地賭客,他亦借一帶一路是母國幫助多國發展經濟作為包裝。據稱,佘智江在菲律賓時就聘用八名員工,向中國內地民眾非法售賣彩票,並持有中華總企業的40%股權。內地報道指,佘智江能夠崛起,得益於其堂兄的支持;其堂兄在澳門、韓國、菲律賓均有賭場業務。

2017年,佘智江取得柬埔寨國籍,同時使用三至四個化名營運業務。同時,他的亞太國際控股有限公司在香港註冊,註冊資本僅100港元。2017年9月,佘智江塑造為新興企業家形象,旗下亞太公司宣稱在緬甸亞太妙瓦底經濟特區大額投資。

該特區當時被包裝成中國一帶一路經濟走廊,會發展為高科技樞紐、金融中心與休閒旅遊點,並為投資者提供稅務優惠。值得玩味的是,中國駐當地大使館其後在2020年8月澄清,亞太公司在緬甸的投資和一帶一路無關。美國國務院資料顯示,佘智江後來同時取得泰國與緬甸國籍。

侵害人權與國際通緝

2021年,中國政府透過國際刑警組織對佘智江發布紅色通緝令。他被控從事非法賭博,大量中國內地民眾受害,造成至少1.5億元損失。2025年9月,美國國務院公開列舉佘智江涉嫌非法活動,例如他旗下的亞太公司與克倫民族軍旗下的Chit Linn Mying公司成立合資企業,針對美國公民開展詐騙活動。

據報,克倫民族軍為佘智江旗下緬甸亞太公司營運的妙瓦底詐騙園區提供能源。園區內匯集各式非法活動:賭博、人口販運、販毒、賣淫。酷刑、強迫勞動與侵害人權在此類詐騙園區司空見慣;園區員工多為從中國及其他國家綁架而來的受害者,如同奴隸一般工作,還要達成固定業績指標。

內地媒體報道,中方對佘智江發布紅通後,中國警方與泰國警方展開合作。2022年8月,警方在泰國曼谷會見佘智江;內地媒體形容,佘智江當初態度囂張,聲稱會動用自己的人脈擺平事件。

引渡攻防與法律爭訟

佘智江在泰國抗爭三年,反對被引渡回中國。其律師辯稱,佘智江只不過是一名城市開發商,中國當局捏造指控,目的是將他引渡回國。佘智江甚至聲稱自己是中國特工,掌握太多一帶一路相關機密,如果被遣返就會遭到滅口。

2022年10月,泰國憲法法院9票對0票一致裁決:2008年《引渡法》第19及第21條並不違反泰國憲法,法條亦沒有過度限制被告人權利。這項法律訴訟由佘智江發起,他致函國際刑警組織,聲稱自己在泰國監獄遭受包括暴力在內的非人道待遇。泰國司法部長塔維・索德松否認相關指控,表示佘智江在獄中待遇良好,有權會見律師。上訴失敗後,佘智江須於90日內引渡回中國。

2025年11月12日,佘智江由泰國引渡至中國。在重兵戒護之下移交中方,隨即飛往南京受審。近期內地媒體播出畫面,佘智江認罪悔過,稱當初本應以合法、正規方式經營業務。

跨境犯罪動態分析

從跨境犯罪政治學角度觀察,佘智江案有幾項重要特點:

第一,佘智江先後在菲律賓、緬甸與泰緬邊境一帶投資經商,成為知名海外華商。他的經歷和緬甸臘戌四大家族頗為相似,但又有區別。佘智江偏向單打獨鬥,不像臘戌四大家族舉族遷移到東南亞。兩者共通點都是透過非法手段謀取暴利;同時塑造成功企業家形像,對外捐獻慈善,宣稱推動地區發展。

第二,這類海外華商善於利用緬甸內部權力真空與泰緬邊境管治漏洞,迅速建立勢力。他們的投資雖在當地商界配合下製造局部經濟繁榮的假象,但繁榮外表之下卻是犯罪帝國。佘智江的新亞太城,當初就包裝成高科技樞紐及休閒度假勝地。 

政黑共生與執法策略

第三,這類華裔商人與地方政軍精英建立緊密關係,臘戌四大家族、佘智江與克倫民族軍的合作都是例子。緬甸中央政府長期無法有效管控廣大邊境地區,在地武裝的庇護之下,「政黑共生」網絡逐步成型。軍閥、無良企業家、跨境犯罪分子構成的三方聯盟,已成為重大國安威脅。 

第四,中國對付這類流動性強的華裔犯罪頭目採取雙線策略:其一就是佘智江案這種引渡;其二是誘騙目標返回中國,伺機抓捕核心成員。例如臘戌魏家其中一名兒子,內地媒體早前報道他赴雲南昆明期間,於夜間被捕。中國警方與泰國、緬甸、柬埔寨同行的合作持續加強,聯手打擊跨境詐騙集團,值得肯定。

內地媒體亦披露,中國警方運用高科技設備定位詐騙園區,並與區內執法單位共享詳細情報。緬甸、柬埔寨受軍閥割據與貪腐影響,邊境執法能力偏弱,跨境警務合作是提升國家管治能力、對抗犯罪集團、強化區域執法的必要手段。

詐騙封建制與國籍漏洞

第五,一種難以管控、具游擊特性的「詐騙封建制」正在興起,園區內勞工遭受奴役剝削、人口販運與毒品流竄,並藉比特幣交易洗黑錢。所謂「詐騙封建制」,指不法企業家聯同地方軍閥、民兵與貪腐官僚結成組織聯盟,設立詐騙基地;園區之中普遍存在奴役、跨境電詐、綁架、人口販運、製毒、洗錢等嚴重侵害人權的罪行。

詐騙封建制唯一的現代特徵,便是運用比特幣與區塊鏈技術清洗黑錢。這類組織聯盟大肆從事非法活動,對中國及東南亞各國執法機關構成重大挑戰。

這類聯盟可說是最惡劣的跨境商業形態:拆散家庭、掠奪個人財產、威脅人身安全、挑戰國家主權安全。只要相關國家執法當局持續保持打擊詐騙的政治決心,犯罪活動有望受到遏制。但殘酷現實是,靠詐騙獲得巨利的犯罪商人會採取游擊戰術,快速將園區遷移到中央軍力與地方警方難以管治的偏遠地帶。

第六,緬甸、泰國、柬埔寨等東南亞國家,有必要更嚴格審查國籍申請。佘智江案例顯示,外國人短期入境後,可透過投資甚至賄賂輕易取得當地國籍,反映存在法律漏洞,需要堵塞。

客觀來看,部分無良華商可以輕易取得東南亞國家國籍,背後利用一套邏輯:國籍和捐獻、投資、所謂地區經濟社會貢獻掛鈎。這機制在不少國家都存在,但當中安全審查出現嚴重缺口,必須收緊。取得國籍的前提:申請人必須守法,不得參與非法活動。

案件的全球啟示

總括而言,佘智江引渡案備受內地媒體關注。此案既體現跨境警務合作的成果,也揭露跨境詐騙集團偽裝成成功商業帝國的手法,塑造出擁有企業精神與領導力的假象。

「詐騙封建制」的核心,是不法企業家、地方軍閥與罪犯三方勾結。在互聯網普及、全球化連結加深之下,這已成為全球最惡劣的跨境犯罪模式。

這套體制匯集綁架、走私、強迫勞動、賣淫、詐騙、殺害受害人、貪腐賄賂、數碼洗黑錢,以及非法取得國籍等多重罪行。這類詐騙屬於重大跨國有組織犯罪,需要全球各國警務單位緊密協調,斬斷犯罪源頭,阻止犯罪勢力蔓延。

Cross-border crime and extradition: The case of She Zhijiang

In recent days, the mainland Chinese media have highlighted the case of extraditing businessman She Zhijiang from Thailand to China as a triumph of Sino-Thailand cooperation in the combat against cross-border crime, especially scam-related and gambling-related criminal activities.

In fact, the extradition of She Zhijiang from Thailand to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in November 2025 deserves our attention, because his rise and fall illustrated not only how a Chinese citizen from the Chinese Mainland climbed up the business ladder across the Chinese border to Southeast Asia, but how he developed his business empire that engaged in illicit activities with profound implications for his motherland. She was born in the province of Hunan, and he migrated to work in various occupations as a cook, car repair worker, security staff and marketing employee in the province of Guangxi at the age of fourteen. At the age of twenty, he migrated to the Philippines where he earned more money by selling lottery tickets illegally to Chinese netizens – a business that earned him 2.2 billion yuan (The Diplomat, October 29, 2020: China Shows Signs of Cracking Down on ‘Silk Road’ Crime – The Diplomat). His lucrative business led She to believe in the power of the internet and cross-border movements that he would continue to fully utilize in his future career development.

Illicit expansion across Southeast Asia

In 2015, She moved to Cambodia to develop his business further by seizing the opportunity of some Cambodian casinos that focused on the mainland Chinese gamblers and by utilizing a justification that his motherland was helping various countries economically in the Belt and Road Initiatives (See: Myanmar: Transnational Networks Plan Digital Dodge in Casino Enclaves | United States Institute of Peace). 

In the Philippines, She was said to hire eight employees to illegally sell lottery tickets to the Chinese people in the Chinese Mainland, and he possessed forty percent of the shares of a company named Chong Hua General Enterprises (see: 实探KK园股东佘智江老家:窗锁黑道往事,门照贵人“有龙”-中国经营网). There were mainland reports saying that She’s rise was attributable to the support of his cousin brother, who had casino businesses in Macau, South Korea, and the Philippines (see: 实探KK园股东佘智江老家:窗锁黑道往事,门照贵人“有龙”_新浪财经_新浪网).

In 2017, She succeeded in acquiring the Cambodian citizenship, while simultaneously using three to four other pseudonyms to operate his businesses. At the same time, his Yatai International Holding Company Limited was registered in Hong Kong with just a minimal amount of “capital” of HK$100. In September 2017, She portrayed himself as an emerging businessman whose Yatai company invested heavily in the Myanmar Yatai Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone (Xinhua, September 17, 2017. See 缅甸推出亚太水沟谷经济特区投资项目-新华网).

The zone was described as an economic corridor of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and it would be developed into a high-tech hub, a financial centre and a leisure tourist spot with tax incentives for investors. Interestingly, the PRC Embassy later in August 2020 clarified that the Yatai investment in Myanmar had no relationship with the Belt and Road Initiative. According to the US Department of State, She eventually obtained the citizenship of both Thailand and Myanmar (see: Treasury Sanctions Southeast Asian Networks Targeting Americans with Cyber Scams | U.S. Department of the Treasury).

Human rights abuses and international notices

In 2021, the PRC government and INTERPOL issued a red notice on She, who allegedly engaged in illegal gambling that victimized a lot of mainland Chinese people and that caused at least 150 million yuan in damages. In September 2025, the US Department of State published a press release that delineated She’s allegedly illicit activities, including his Yatai company’s joint venture with Karen National Army’s holding company named Chit Linn Mying Company Limited, which operated scam activities targeting US citizens (See: Treasury Sanctions Southeast Asian Networks Targeting Americans with Cyber Scams | U.S. Department of the Treasury).

The Karen National Army reportedly provided energy to the scam compound in Shwe Kokko, which was run by the Myanmar Yantai company led by She. The scam compound included an entire range of other illicit activities, including gambling, human trafficking, drug trafficking and prostitution. Torture, forced labour, and abuse of human rights became commonplace in scam compounds where employees were the abducted citizens from China and other countries and where they worked like slaves with fixed targets of business achievements.

The mainland Chinese media have recently shown that the PRC police cooperated with the Thailand police after the Chinese side had issued the red notice on She. The police met She in Bangkok, Thailand in August 2022 and his initial response, according to the mainland Chinese media, was “arrogant” and that he claimed to use his “connections” to settle the problems.

Extradition battles and legal challenges

She fought against his extradition from Thailand to China for three years. His lawyer argued that She was just “an urban developer” and that the Chinese authorities “fabricated” the allegations to have him sent back to China (see: Thai court to extradite scam hub tycoon She Zhijiang to China – The Business Times). She went so far as to claim that he was a Chinese secret agent and that he knew too much about the Belt and Road Initiative, pointing to the danger of being “eliminated” if he were sent back to China (Al Jazeera, September 26, 2024. See: Thai court to extradite scam hub tycoon She Zhijiang to China – The Business Times). 

In October 2022, the Thai Constitutional Court reached a unanimous decision of nine to zero, saying that Sections 19 and 21 of the Extradition Act of 2008 did not violate the Thai constitution, and that the law did not limit the rights of the defendant excessively (Reuters, October 22, 2025. See: Thai Court Upholds Extradition Law in She Zhijiang Case). The legal challenge was launched She Zhijiang, who argued in a letter to the INTERPOL that he endured “inhumane treatment,” including violence, in a Thai prison. Yet, his accusation was denied by the Thai Minister of Justice, Tawee Sodsong, who argued that She was treated well in the prison with the right of access to lawyers. After losing his appeal, She had to be extradited from Thailand to China within ninety days.

On November 12, 2025, She was extradited from Thailand to China. Under heavy armed guards, She was delivered to the Chinese side and he was flown to Nanjing where he faces his trial. In recent days, She was seen in the mainland Chinese media as repenting on his wrongdoing, saying that he should have conducted his businesses in a legalistic and normal way. 

Analysis of cross-border criminal dynamics

From the perspective of analysing the politics of cross-border crime, the She case shows significant characteristics.

First, She became a successful overseas Chinese entrepreneur after he worked and invested in the Philippines, Myanmar and the region around the border between Thailand and Myanmar. His experiences were quite similar to the four big Chinese families in Laukkai, but not the same as them because She appeared to work in a one-man fashion rather than migrating his family members to any particular country in Southeast Asia (see: OPINION – Cross-border crime in Laukkai: The rise and decline of four Chinese families | Macau Business). Their similarities were the use of illegal means to achieve the objective of acquiring profits. They also portray themselves as successful businesspeople who made donations to charity work, and who contributed immensely to regional development.

Second, interestingly, these migrated Chinese businesspeople tended to grasp the opportunity of the regional vacuum in Myanmar and the border along Myanmar and Thailand to establish their businesses rapidly. Undoubtedly, their investment, with the support of other local business elites, did contribute to regional economic development and prosperity, but such “prosperity” hid the criminal activities underlying their business empire, including She’s New Yatai City which was portrayed as a new high-tech hub and leisure resort.

Political-criminal nexuses and enforcement strategies

Third, these ethnic Chinese businesspeople cultivated close connections with political and military elites—reflected in both the four families in Laukkai and She’s relations with the Karen National Army. As such, a political-criminal nexus was gradually established under the protection of local militias at a time when the central state in Myanmar could not exercise control over vast border areas. This triple alliance between warlords, unethical businesspeople, and cross-border criminal elements has become a major challenge to national security, as scam-related activities threaten personal safety and private property across multiple nations.

Fourth, to control mobile ethnic Chinese businesspeople, the PRC has deployed a two-pronged strategy: seeking their extradition, as in She’s case, and luring them to visit China, where core members are arrested. One of the sons of the Wei family in Laukkai, for example, was recently shown in mainland media being arrested at night following a visit to Kunming city in Yunnan province. Credit must be given to Chinese police whose collaboration with counterparts in Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia has intensified to curb cross-border scam operations.

The mainland Chinese media have also revealed that PRC police utilise high-tech equipment to locate scam syndicates, sharing detailed intelligence with regional forces. Given that Myanmar and Cambodia feature relatively weak border policing due to warlordism and corruption, cross-border police cooperation is necessary to enhance state capacity, maintain state autonomy vis-à-vis crime groups, and improve regional law enforcement capabilities.

Defining scam feudalism and citizenship loopholes

Fifth, there is a phenomenon of the emergence of uncontrollable and guerilla-type scam feudalism in which slave workers are exploited, human trafficking is serious, drugs trafficking is commonplace, and money laundering is fostered through the trading of bitcoins. Scam feudalism is defined here as a phenomenon in which unethical businesspeople form an organizational alliance with local warlords, local militias and corrupt bureaucrats to set up scam bases where slavery, cross-border cheating, telecom fraud, kidnapping, human trafficking, drugs production, money laundering, and human rights abuse are prevalent and serious.

What is only “modern” in scam feudalism is the usage of bitcoins and block chain to launder dirty money. The organizational alliances of scam feudalism have been engaging in illicit activities that pose a tremendous challenge to the law-enforcement authorities of China and other countries in Southeast Asia.

These alliances can be regarded as the worst form of cross-national or cross-border businesses that tear families apart, steal individual properties, undermine personal security, and challenge national security. With the persistence of the political will of police of these countries to fight scam crime, it is hoped that scam-related criminal activities can be controlled. But the harsh reality is that entrepreneurs who profited lucratively from scam crime shifted their compounds by adopting the guerilla tactics, moving their bases of operations rapidly to other remote areas without the easy control of local police and central-level military.

Sixth, the question of acquiring citizenship may have to be reviewed in a more rigorous way by some Southeast Asian countries, including Myanmar, Thailand and Cambodia. If foreign citizens can acquire citizenship easily through investment schemes or even bribery after they arrive at a new target country for a short period of time, as with the case of She, there must be some legal loopholes that will have to be plugged (see: Criminals May Benefit As Cambodia Hides New Citizenship Data | OCCRP).

From an objective standpoint, the ease in which some unethical Chinese businesspeople could obtain citizenships in some Southeast countries meant that they grasped a loophole that citizenship was tied directly to their donations, investment and contributions to regional economic and social prosperity – a normal phenomenon perhaps in many countries but a serious gap that has to be closed with far more rigorous security checks. Citizenship entails a necessary condition that the applicants must observe the law and must not engage in illegal activities. 

Global implications

In conclusion, the extradition of the case of She Zhijiang has recently been highlighted in the mainland Chinese media. While his case demonstrates the success of cross-border police cooperation, it has profound implications for the operation of cross-border scam syndicates, which have been camouflaged as “successful” business empire with entrepreneurial “spirit” and “leadership.”

Scam feudalism is characterized by the triple alliance between unethical businesspeople, local warlords, and criminal elements. It is currently the worst form of cross-border crime in the world, seizing the opportunity of an increasingly globalized world with countries interconnected with the widespread use of the internet.

Scam feudalism merges diverse types of cross-border criminal activities, ranging from human kidnapping to smuggling, from forced labour to prostitution, from cheating to killing victims, from bribery to corruption, and from digitalized money laundering to the attainment of citizenship through shady means. Scam crime has undoubtedly become one of the worst transnational organized crimes that requires all nations, especially the police, in the world to make extra efforts and coordination to eliminate its origins and to terminate its further growth.

原刊於澳門新聞通訊社(MNA)網站,本社獲作者授權轉載。(原文按此)

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