香格里拉對話吸引了世界各國國防領導人齊聚新加坡討論與安全相關的問題，而傳媒的焦點則集中在中美軍事外交上。
在香格里拉對話開幕式上，美國國防部長奧斯汀上前與中國國務委員兼國防部長李尚福握手。兩人被安排坐在貴賓席上，相對而坐。李尚福通過翻譯告訴奧斯汀，他很高興見到美國國防部長。
據傳媒報道，中國拒絕了美方 5 月份提出的兩國國防部長將在新加坡舉行會晤的要求。這種拒絕被視為中美軍事關係已降到冰點。美國國防部方面還以奧斯汀的名義致函李尚福，希望華盛頓和北京能夠保持開放的溝通和對話，避免任何相互競爭變成衝突的危險。
當傳媒問到中方拒絕美方會晤要求，是否是因為美方對李尚福實施制裁時，中國外交部發言人毛寧回應稱，美方「清楚」當前中美兩軍對話面臨困難的原因。毛寧敦促美方應「切實尊重」中國的主權安全和利益關切，立即「糾正錯誤做法」，展現「誠意」，為中美兩軍對話溝通「創造必要的氛圍和條件」。
特朗普政府制裁李尚福 至今未撤銷
2019年9月，特朗普政府以李尚福「涉及」向俄羅斯購買大量軍備為由，對李尚福實施制裁，至今仍然是中美兩軍對話的障礙。
在北京看來，如果這項制裁持續下去，中美防務首長之間的正式會晤「不合適」。2021年以來，中方先後十多次拒絕了美國軍方提出的各種級別的會晤要求。
6月2日，李尚福會見新加坡國防部長黃永宏並表達三個重要立場。李尚福首先表示，「台灣是中國的台灣」，絕不允許民進黨當局「挾洋謀獨」；絕不允許任何外國勢力「以台制華」；絕不承諾放棄使用武力。 其次，李尚福和黃永宏簽署了一份諒解備忘錄，以保持直接和保密的電話溝通和對話。第三，李尚福表示，中國堅定支持東盟在地區架構中發揮關鍵作用，支持東盟保持戰略自主，致力構建中國東盟「命運共同體」。
美國念念不忘 應對中國「威脅」
香格里拉對話舉行之際，美國、日本、澳洲和菲律賓舉行4國防長會談，以加強安全合作和應對「中國片面的海洋行動擴大」。四個國家將考慮如何加強一些島嶼的防衛能力，包括琉球群島、台灣和菲律賓的島嶼，以應對所謂的「中國威脅」。
在地緣政治上，香格里拉對話是在美國及其盟友將中國視為「軍事威脅」，必須藉着軍事聯盟進行威懾的時候舉行的。這樣，香格里拉對話期間，中國軍方拒絕與美方舉行正式會晤也就可以理解了。
最重要的是，李尚福對台灣的評論，表明中國反對美國企圖將台灣變成其「保護國」。李尚福關於北京反對任何外國勢力「以台制華」的言論，表明了中國如何看待美國的軍事立場和行動。從客觀的角度來看，美國一直在向台灣提供武器是為了「威懾來自中國的軍事威脅」──這種情況使北京拒絕放棄使用武力來對付台獨的圖謀。
華盛頓明撐蔡政府 北京無法接受
此外，如果美國政府明確支持民進黨治下的台灣政府，北京認為美國的這種立場在政治上、意識形態上和軍事上都是不可接受的。
6月1日，美國政府在華盛頓與台灣簽署《21世紀貿易倡議》首批協定後，中國外交部發言人表示，美台貿易倡議是向台獨分裂勢力發出錯誤信號；民進黨當局打着經貿合作的幌子搞「倚美謀獨」。北京反對美國政府與台灣方面進行任何正式和官方的往來。因此，華盛頓和台北之間更密切的貿易關係，被北京視為具有巨大政治影響的經濟結盟。
在這種困難的情況下，中美軍事外交無法在本次香格里拉對話中取得任何突破，也就可以理解了。
中國倡導可持續全球安全觀
6月4日，李尚福在第20屆香格里拉對話會上，就「中國的新安全倡議」議題作大會發言。
李尚福發表的「中國的新安全倡議」包含以下特點：
第一，中國倡導共同、綜合、合作、可持續的安全觀。
第二，各國應當尊重其他國家的主權和領土完整。。
第三，各國的戰略自主和發展權必須尊重。
第四，任何戰略都不能以意識形態劃線，以所謂的「假想威脅」構建排他性軍事同盟。
第五，要用互信協商消弭對抗衝突，用開放包容防範陣營對抗。
第六，相互尊重、和平共處、合作共贏三條原則才是中美兩國正確相處之道。
第七，台灣是中國的台灣，怎麼解決台灣問題是中國人自己的事，不容任何外部勢力插手干涉。
中國的新安全倡議重申，彼此尊重、平等相待才能和諧相處。堅決反對某些國家把自己的意志強加於人，把自己的利益凌駕於人，把自己的安全建立在別人不安全之上。
從中國的角度來看，實現全球安全倡議的平台包括各大洲及國際和地區組織。
中國倡導的全球安全倡議似乎與美國的地緣政治戰略並不一致。二戰後，美國一直扮演「國際警察」的角色，令中國等一些國家將美國華視為在世界上強力輸出其意識形態和軍事霸權。中國倡導的全球安全倡議在意識形態上更傾向於社會主義，地緣政治觸及各大洲和所有主要地區組織，自然對美國構成「安全威脅」。
中央警示面臨國家安全問題更複雜
有意思的是，香格里拉對話會恰逢2023年5月30日在北京召開的第20屆中央國家安全委員會第一次會議。會議由習近平主持，據新華社報道，會議強調，中國所面臨國家安全問題的複雜程度、艱巨程度「明顯加大」。因此，「要加快推進國家安全體系和能力現代化」，「切實做好維護政治安全、提升網絡數據人工智能安全治理水平、加快建設國家安全風險監測預警體系、推進國家安全法治建設、加強國家安全教育等方面工作」。 此外，地方黨組織要「堅決維護國家主權、安全和發展利益」。 全國人大常委會稍後將修改《反間諜法》。
總而言之，在美國及其盟友一直將中國視為「軍事威脅」並採取行動通過日益明確的與台灣結盟來遏制中國的背景下，中美防長在本屆香格里拉對話期間的會面，出現突破變得極其困難。此外，香格里拉對話是在中國感到來自外部勢力的「嚴重國家安全威脅」下舉行的。正是基於美國及其盟友認為的「中國威脅論」，中國公布和倡導其全球安全倡議是可以理解的。儘管如此，由於中美之間潛在的意識形態差異，中美關係短期和較長時間都難望好轉。同樣，中美軍事外交的特點自然更多的是「麥克風」外交和政治姿態，而不是能夠扭轉僵局的深度談判。
The Shangri-La Dialogue and Sino-US Military Diplomacy
While the Shangri-La Dialogue has been attracting defence leaders around the world to gather in Singapore to discuss security-related issues, the media spotlight is focusing on Sino-US military diplomacy.
At the opening session of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin walked up and shook hands with the Chinese State Councillor and Minister of National Defence Li Shangfu. They both were arranged to sit on the VIP table and sitting opposite each other. Li told Austin through a translator that he was delighted to meet the US Defence Secretary.
According to media reports, China has rejected a request from the US side in May that both defence secretaries would hold a meeting in Singapore. This rejection has been seen as a sign that the Sino-US military relations have reached their limits. The US defence side also sent a letter written by Austin to Li, hoping that Washington and Beijing would be able to maintain open communication and dialogue for the sake of avoiding any trend of turning mutual competition into conflicts.
When asked by the media whether the Chinese rejection of the US request for a meeting was due to the US sanction imposed on Li, the Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson Mao Ning replied that the US was “clear” about why Sino-US military relations encountered difficulties. Mao urged the US side to “respect” China’s sovereignty, security, and interest concerns, and to “correct wrong practices” as well as to show “sincerity and create the necessary atmosphere and conditions for dialogue and communication.”
The US sanction imposed on Li Shangfu in September 2019 when the Trump administration targeted at him for being “involved” in the weapons transactions with Russia remains an obstacle to closer Sino-US military relations.
From the perspective of Beijing, if this sanction persists, formal meetings between the military defence chiefs from the Chinese and American sides are “unsuitable.” Since 2021, the Chinese side rejected the US military side’s requests for various kinds and levels of meetings over ten times.
On June 2nd, Li Shangfu met the Singapore defence minister Dr. Ng Eng Hen and made three major remarks. First, Li said that “Taiwan is China’s Taiwan,” that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) disallows any foreign forces to “use Taiwan to contain China,” and that the PRC does not abandon the promise of using force to settle the Taiwan issue. Second, Li and Ng signed a memorandum of understanding to maintain direct and confidential telephone communication as well as dialogue. Third, Li said that China resolutely supports the ASEAN to play a crucial role in the construction of a regional community, to maintain its strategic autonomy, and to build up an “entity of common destiny” with China.
The Shangri-La dialogue is taking place at a time when four countries, including the US, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, are going to have a meeting to strengthen their security cooperation and to deal with “the rapidly expanding maritime China.” The four states are going to consider how to strengthen some islands militarily, including the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and those in the Philippines, to cope with the perceived “China threat.”
Geopolitically, the Shangri-La dialogue is taking place at a time when the US and its allies are perceiving China as a “military threat” that must be deterred by utilizing military alliances. If so, it is understandable why the Chinese defence side has refused to meet the US side in a formal meeting during the Shangri-La Dialogue.
Most significantly, the Chinese defence chief’s comments on Taiwan points to the PRC’s opposition to the way in which the US appears to turn Taiwan into its “protectorate.” Li’s remarks on Beijing’s opposition to any foreign force’s usage of Taiwan “to contain China” is indicative of how the PRC perceives the US military stance and action. From an objective perspective, the US has been providing weapons to Taiwan for the sake of “deterring the military threat” from the PRC” – a scenario that makes Beijing refuse to abandon the use of “force” to deal with Taiwan’s political future.
Furthermore, if the US government is explicitly supportive of the Taiwan government under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Beijing finds this US position politically, ideologically, and militarily unacceptable.
On June 1, once the US government signed the 21st century trade agreement with Taiwan in Washington, the PRC foreign ministry commented that the trade initiative between the US and Taiwan sides was an attempt to let the “DPP achieve its self-interest at the expense of the interest of the Taiwan comrades.” Beijing opposes any formal and official interaction between the US government and the Taiwan side. As such, the closer trade relations between Washington and Taipei are seen by Beijing as an economic alliance with tremendous political implications.
Under these difficult circumstances, it is understandable why the Sino-US military diplomacy cannot make any breakthrough in the current Shangri-La Dialogue.
Li is expected to deliver a speech on China’s global security initiative, whose concept was already published by the Foreign Ministry on February 21, 2023.
The PRC’s Global Security Initiative contains some features.
First, China advocates that countries in the world should be committed to the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security.
Second, the states in the world must be committed to respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries.
Third, countries in the world must be committed to following the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.
Fourth, they should be committed to taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously.
Fifth, they should be committed to resolving their differences and disputes through dialogue and consultation.
Sixth, global security has to be protected in both traditional and non-traditional aspects.
The key to enhance the cooperation among states, according to the Global Security Initiative, is to uphold multilateralism and to use regional and international organizations for the sake of maintaining and achieving world peace and promoting sustainable development in the world.
The Global Security Initiative also emphasizes the importance of reducing the risks of any nuclear war.
The platforms of achieving the global security initiative, from the PRC perspective, includes all the continents and international as well as regional organizations.
The Global Security Initiative advocated by the PRC appears to be at odds with the US geopolitical strategy. After the Second World War, the US has been acting as international police – an action that has promoted some countries, including China, to see Washington as imposing its ideological and military hegemony in the world. The Global Security Initiative advocated by China tends to be more socialist in its ideological tone, and its geopolitical reach to every continent and to all major regional organizations naturally pose a “security threat” to the US.
Interestingly, the Shangri-La Dialogue is held at a time that coincides with the first meeting of the 20th Central National Security Commission held in Beijing on May 30, 2023. The meeting was presided over by President Xi Jinping, who according to the Xinhua news agency emphasized that China is facing “complex and serious circumstances” in its comprehensive national security. As such, China must “promote national security leadership and the rule of law system and perfect its strategic and policy systems.” Furthermore, the party organizations at the local level must “resolutely protect national sovereignty, security and developmental interest.” The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress will later revise the anti-espionage law.
In conclusion, under the context in which the US and its allies have been seeing China as a “military threat” and taking action to deter it through an increasingly explicit alliance with Taiwan, it is exceedingly difficult to expect any breakthrough in Sino-US military communication and meeting during the current Shangri-La Dialogue. Moreover, the Shangri-La Dialogue is held at a time when China is perceiving “serious” national security threats from outside forces. Exactly because of the perception of “the China threat” in the minds of US and its allies, the PRC’s publication and advocacy of its Global Security Initiative are understandable. Still, because of the underlying ideological differences between China and the US, Sino-US relations cannot expect to take a change for the better in the short and long run. Similarly, the Sino-US military diplomacy is naturally characterized more by megaphone diplomacy and political posturing rather than by in-depth negotiations that can turn the current impasse into a much brighter scenario.
曾國平
譚新強
劉銳紹
艾雲豪
車品覺
余錦明
周光蓁
張宗永
潘文慧
李大齊
林嘉良
黃錦輝
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