最近的時事，包括中美在阿拉斯加的高層戰略對話，以及國家主席習近平在福建的講話，都彰顯了中國的經濟實用主義，以及在文明衝突時代北京對美台的政治姿態。
中西方政治文明的衝突
3月18日，中國政府與拜登政府的外交關係中最具爆炸性的對話在阿拉斯加舉行，美國國務卿布林肯就中國對新疆、香港和台灣問題的處理方式，對中共中央政治局委員、中央外事工作委員會秘書長楊潔篪公開表示不滿，又指責中國對美國「網絡攻擊」及「經濟脅迫」美國的盟友。布林肯的挑釁性言論，加上美國在楊潔篪抵阿拉斯加前一天，對分管香港事務的中國官員實行制裁，顯然被中國代表視為「霸權主義行為」。「來而不往非禮也」，楊潔篪也批評美國的武力和金融霸權、對其他國家的「長臂管轄」和打壓，強調「美國有美國式的民主，中國有中國式的民主」。
正如已故的亨廷頓教授（Prof. Samuel Huntington）很久以前就假設的那樣，「中華」政治文明與西方政治文明之間的衝突，在楊潔篪與布林肯的對話中日益突顯。
對於中國來說，布林肯關於將新疆和香港與台灣混為一談的言論，在政治上是不可接受的；中國將新疆和香港視為不容外國干涉的內政，但是美國認為新疆和香港事態的發展，正影響美國人珍視的「自由和民主」價值觀。為了回應美方的指責，楊潔篪強調中國有中國式的民主，不同於西方。很明顯，「印太地區」已由兩個大國以政治劃分：一邊是美國及其「盟友」，另一邊是中國和對中國友好的國家。
一些美國評論家認為，楊潔篪對布林肯言論是做給中國內地觀眾看的，但這樣看是不了解中國的精英政治文化。楊潔篪的言論不僅要在中國觀眾面前表現中國的強硬立場，而且更可能要向發展中國家證明，中國在意識形態的分歧上，敢於和美國叫板。許多發展中國家在意識形態上支持中國不干涉別國內政，例如支持北京在香港實行《港區國安法》。正如已故政治學家兼漢學家白魯恂（Lucian Pye）所言，中國的政治文化非常重視「面子」，布林肯的開場白似乎不給中國人「面子」，因此楊潔篪長篇而強硬的回應可說是自然不過。
不過，對於中美會談更為清醒的分析表明，中美兩國代表的確有坐下來討論其他議題，例如氣候變化及在應對新冠病毒方面的政府合作。
中美意識形態上的差異
有趣的是，在中美阿拉斯加高層對話結束後，中國外長王毅在廣西會見了俄羅斯外長拉夫羅夫。王毅強調各國都應遵循《聯合國憲章》宗旨和原則，奉行真正的多邊主義，致力於國際關係民主化，接受並促進不同社會制度和發展道路國家和平共處、共同發展。王毅的言論顯然是衝着布林肯而來，彰顯了中美在意識形態上的差異。
拉夫羅夫也暗示有西方國家利用非政府組織來促進其他國家的政治變革，隱晦地批評了西方支持的「顏色革命」。 事實上，中國一直對「顏色革命」保持高度警惕，就像香港在2019年的情況一樣，當時北京將反修例示威視為本地反對派與外國「勾結」，目的是「顛覆」特區和中國政府。
由於全球意識形態的嚴重衝突，亞洲正受到「新冷戰」威脅的影響。3月19日，北韓與與馬來西亞斷交。 3月21日，北韓又試射了兩枚短程巡航導彈。據報道，自2011年以來，北韓共發射了100多枚導彈，並進行了4次核試。這樣，日本近年增加軍事預算，以應對中國和北韓的「軍事威脅」便不足為奇了。
儘管亞洲籠罩着一片「新冷戰」的氣氛，但中國仍堅持其經濟實用主義。3月25日，中國商務部表示，中國已完成核准《區域全面經濟夥伴關係》（RCEP）協定，表明中國決心推動有關協定，這至少需要15個成員國中的9個國家核准。
如果說中國外交奉行的是經濟實用主義，那麼在習近平主席於3月22日至26日對福建進行的4天考察中，也可以看出背後的政治實用主義。他視察了紀念宋代大儒朱熹的「朱熹園」，並表示文明是一個國家和民族的靈魂，實現中國夢必須對建立在五千年文明基礎上的中國特色社會主義道路充滿信心。
習近平最重要的講話是談大陸如何與台灣打交道。他提出「要在探索海峽兩岸融合發展新路上邁出更大步伐」，要求「突出以通促融、以惠促融、以情促融，勇於探索海峽兩岸融合發展新路」。他的講話可視作對台灣同胞的務實政治姿態，通過探索雙方如何促進經濟、文化和人員往來，將大陸的熱情之手伸向台灣。
總之，在中美之間意識形態日益分歧和「文明衝突」的情況下，中國領導人一直強調經濟、政治和文化實用主義的重要性，包括中美阿拉斯加對話充滿火藥味的開場白和之後的中俄外長會晤，中國強調RCEP的經濟利益等，最重要的是，習近平強調探索海峽兩岸融合發展的新路，可以看作是在中西意識形態和文明衝突中，北京在對美、對台的政治姿態中揉合了實用主義的證據。
OPINION-China’s Pragmatism and Political Posturing to US and Taiwan in the Era of Civilizational Clashes
Recent events, including the US-China encounters in Alaska and the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s remarks in Fujian, have shown the economic pragmatism of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese political posturing to US and Taiwan in the era of civilizational clashes.
The most diplomatically explosive encounter between the PRC government and the new Joe Biden administration took place in Alaska on March 18, when the US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken told the PRC State Councilor Yang Jiechi openly that the US was unhappy with not only how China dealt with Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan, but also the Chinese “cyber-attacks” on the US and “economic coercion” toward US allies. Blinken’s provocative open remarks, together with the US sanctions on Chinese officials handling Hong Kong just a day before Yang Jiechi’s arrival at Alaska, were apparently regarded by the PRC delegation as an “hegemonic move.” In response, Yang gave a 15-minute speech criticizing the US “hegemony” and “democracy” and emphasizing that Chinese democracy must be different from the West.
The clashes between the “Sinic” political civilization and the Western political civilization, as the late Professor Samuel Huntington had long hypothesized and predicted, became increasingly prominent in the recent encounter between Blinken and Yang.
To the Chinese delegates, Blinken’s remarks which mixed Xinjiang and Hong Kong with Taiwan were already politically unacceptable. Xinjiang and Hong Kong are regarded by the PRC as its internal matters outside the influence of foreign states. But the US perceives Xinjiang and Hong Kong’s developments as impinging on the values of freedom and democracy cherished by the Americans. In response to the US values, Yang asserted that China has its own style of democracy different from the West. When Yang maintained that China has its freedom and democracy, and when Blinken revealed that the US allies like Japan and South Korea share the American worries about China, it was crystal clear that the Asia Pacific region is now deeply politically divided by two blocs, namely the US-led allies and PRC-style regimes.
Compounding the profound ideological and civilizational differences between China and the US was the meeting of Quad on March 12, when the first leaders of four nations – the US, Japan, India and Australia – attended a summit with pledges to work together on the Covid-19 vaccines, supply chains and technological development. From the Chinese perspective, the Quad summit appeared to be a US-led alliance to contain China, even though the issues discussed in the summit avoided giving an outside impression that it aimed at containing the PRC’s rise. The tense relations between China and India over their border, and between China and Australia over trade issues, have already made the Quad summit politically sensitive. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army conducted combat drills in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea at a time when the heads of governments of Quad held their first summit. Clearly, the Chinese made political posturing in response to the actions of US-led allies in Asia.
Some American commentators believed that Yang’s immediate and long response to Blinken’s remarks were targeted at China’s domestic audience. However, such assessment failed to understand the Chinese elite political culture. Yang’s comments appeared to be fully psychologically prepared for not just showing the PRC’s tough stance in front of the domestic Chinese audience, but arguably more in demonstrating to the developing states that China dares to confront the US in terms of ideological values and differences. Many developing states have supported China ideologically and refrained from interfering with its internal matters. For instance, they supported the enactment of the national security law in Hong Kong shortly after late June 2020. The PRC political culture, as the late political scientist Lucian Pye said, attaches importance to the concept of face (mianzi). Blinken’s opening remarks appeared to ignore the Chinese face and the resulting long and tough response from Yang was arguably natural.
While most Western and Asian media focused on the explosive one hour and 15 minutes exchanges between the Chinese delegation and the US side in Alaska, a more sober analysis of the meeting could show that both the Chinese and American delegations did sit down to talk about other practical issues, such as climate change and their governmental cooperation in dealing with Covid-19.
Interestingly, just five days after the Alaska meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who was one key member of the PRC delegation to Alaska, met Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Both affirmed the need for China and Russia to consolidate high-level exchanges, to renew the China-Russia Treaty of Good-neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, to discuss mutual recognition of health codes, and to promote cooperation in such areas as trade, 5G, big data, green economy, climate change, and environmental protection. Wang raised the issue of “rules-based international order,” which to the PRC side “reflects the rules of a few countries and does not represent the will of the international community.” Wang’s remarks were directed at Blinken’s comment on the need for China to respect the “”rules-based international order.” Clearly, Sino-US ideological differences could be found in the Wang-Lavrov meeting.
Lavrov emphasized that Russia and China should deepen coordination and collaboration in multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS and APEC, and that the two sides should oppose external forces’ interference by utilizing social networks in the domestic affairs of the two countries. Lavrov implied that Western states utilized non-governmental organizations to foster political changes in other countries – an implicit criticism of “color revolution” backed up by the West. In fact, China remains highly vigilant of the likelihood of “color revolution,” as with the case of Hong Kong in 2019 when the anti-extradition movement was perceived by Beijing as the action of local protestors to “collude” with foreign states to “subvert” the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese regimes.
Due to serious clashes of ideological values in the world, Asia is deeply affected by the threat of an emerging new Cold War. On March 19, North Korea cut its diplomatic relations with Malaysia in retaliation of the latter’s move to extradite a North Korean to the US on charges of laundering money and violating the UN sanctions by supplying prohibited items to North Korea through Malaysia. On March 25, North Korea launched a new type of tactical guided projectile which could reach 600 km (373 miles) off its east coast and into the Sea of Japan. The new missile could carry a payload of 2.5 tons, which would make it possible to be equipped with a nuclear warhead. The Biden administration said the missile launch violated the UN resolution. The Japanese government strongly protested the North Korean missile launch. Since 2011, North Korea reportedly launched more than 100 missiles and conducted four nuclear weapons tests. Given the perceived rising Chinese military threat and North Korean missiles menace, it is not surprising that Japan has been rearming itself militarily and rapidly in recent years.
Despite the looming new Cold War atmosphere in Asia, China has been maintaining its economic pragmatism. On March 25, the PRC Ministry of Commerce remarked that China had completed the ratification of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement. The ratification showed China’s determination to push forward the trade deal, which needs at least nine of the fifteen member countries’ endorsement. From the Chinese perspective, Japan’s ratification of the deal will be significant In November 2020, China and Japan reached an agreement on how to reduce bilateral tariff – a breakthrough in their economic relations. The proportion of Japanese products that the PRC will exempt tariffs is set to increase from eight percent to 86 percent, whereas Japan’s duty-free ration for PRC products will reach the same level. On March 25, the PRC Ministry of Commerce announced that China is fully prepared for the implementation of RCEP agreement, including 613 legally binding stipulations. If RCEP were enforced, 30 percent of the PRC exports would have the privilege of having zero tariffs. In terms of trade expansion, China is eager to get the RCEP implementation as soon as possible.
If economic pragmatism prevails in the Chinese diplomatic mentality, then political pragmatism can also be seen in the remarks made by President Xi Jinping in his four-day visit to Fujian from March 22 to 26. He inspected a cultural park commemorating poet Zhu Xi, adding that civilization is the soul of a country and nation. Moreover, the realization of the Chinese dream must be confident in the Chinese path of socialism, which has been built upon the 5,000 years of civilization.
The most important remark of President Xi was directed at how mainland China is dealing with Taiwan. He said that Fujian should emphasize open human interactions, special privileges and emotional ties to promote its integration with Taiwan, and that one can “explore the new path of cross-strait integration and development.” As Fujian is geographically near Taiwan, President Xi’s remarks can be seen as a pragmatic political gesture to the Taiwan comrades, extending the PRC’s warm hands to the Taiwan side through the exploration of how both sides can and will foster economic, cultural and human interactions.
In conclusion, China and its political leaders have been emphasizing the importance of economic, political and cultural pragmatism amid the increasingly diverging ideological and civilizational clashes between China and the US-led allies. The curious combinations of the open disputes during the Sino-US talks in Alaska, the Sino-Russian meeting shortly afterwards, the Chinese emphasis on the economic benefits of RCEP implementation, and most importantly, President Xi’s emphasis on the exploration of a new integration and developmental path for mainland China and Taiwan, can be seen as the evidence of merging Chinese pragmatism with political posturing to the US and Taiwan in the ideological and civilizational conflicts between China and the West.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。
陳家偉
海星
洪蘭
丁惠芳
李文基
靳杰強
張玉峰
楊興安
許志榮
胡孟青
鄭楚雄
黃錦輝
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