港澳辦主任夏寶龍於4月13日至19日訪問香港6日，對於北京在全國人大和政協「兩會」後，如何處理香港的問題，具有非常重要的意義。
首先，現年70歲的夏寶龍留任港澳辦主任一職，意味中央政府需要時間培養繼任人。最重要的是，在港澳辦併入中共中央，而不是留在國務院作為一個機構後，夏寶龍隨即訪問香港。這種組織變化的含義是，黨中央重新集中港澳辦的職能和工作，而不是將任務委託給國務院。在中共領導下集中港澳辦的權力，意味着夏寶龍必須在「兩會」後不久來到香港視察，向黨中央報告香港事務及其發展。
中共依靠港澳辦主任 了解兩地最新發展
其次，夏寶龍被任命為中央港澳工作領導小組常務副組長，小組組長是新任政治局常委丁薛祥。 其他5名副組長分別是夏寶龍、統戰部部長石泰峰、中央政法委書記陳文清、公安部部長王小洪、外交部長秦剛。
儘管夏寶龍不再是中央委員，但他被任命為中央港澳工作領導小組副組長，意味着中共依靠港澳辦主任了解港澳兩地的最新發展。因此，他對香港的訪問表明了中央對港發展的深切關注。 可以預料，夏寶龍必須寫一份關於香港的報告給中央港澳工作領導小組，因為他的訪問被視為「考察和學習之旅」──中央政府高層到地方深入了解情況的典型習方式。
第三，香港傳媒忽略了夏寶龍訪港前3天的一個重要舉動──他參加了港澳辦學習貫徹習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想主題教育動員大會。會上，夏寶龍致辭表示，主題教育是習近平時代中國特式社會主義的重要內容，港澳辦黨員幹部要進一步發揚鬥爭精神，推進全面從嚴治黨、鍛造港澳工作「鐵軍」。
夏寶龍表示港澳辦要大興調查研究，解決港澳的新情況、新問題。 有趣且有意義的是，新成立的負責全國教育的中央第23指導組組長胡文容出席了會議。胡文容補充說，主題教育要明確職責分工，充分體現「政治自覺和政治站位」。 胡文容的出席和夏寶龍的發言，都表明了港澳辦範圍內習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想主題教育對港澳工作的重要性。
關注國民教育 國安亦是要務
第四，與香港教育工作重要性相關的，是夏寶龍與本港年輕人的互動，包括了香港科技大學的學生和InnoHK創新香港研發平台的年輕科研人員。夏寶龍還與中小學生會面，並由行政長官李家超和教育局局長蔡若蓮陪同參觀學校，可見他對國民教育發展的關注。他和小學生一起打乒乓球，囑咐他們好好學習，珍惜寶貴的發展機會。顯然，青年發展是此次考察的重要議程之一，與4月10日中央第23指導小組胡文容參加的港澳辦會議強調主題教育工作一致。
第五，夏寶龍在港的公開講話，直指維護國家安全是第一要務，表示亂港有害，反對不等於民主，遊行不是表達公眾訴求的唯一方式。顯然，從中央政府對香港的評估來看，一方面是因為香港的防疫措施在大約兩個月前剛解除，另一方面主要是因為香港仍然可能有破壞社會和政體穩定的潛在不穩定因素，強調維護國家安全是可以理解的，這種強調與中共二十大和「兩會」期間的涉港報告是一致的。
第六，如果維護國家安全是令在必行，23條立法提上立法會便是時間問題。港府對第23條立法的時間表仍然模棱兩可──可能是在2023年或最遲在2024年。這種模棱兩可的原因是，最終將交由北京的中央政府決定。
鑑於2019年推動逃犯條例（修訂）草案導致抗議和暴力事件──這場風波的意外後果是在2020年1月的台灣總統選舉中有利民進黨選情──香港《基本法》第23條立法的時機自然是由北京決定。在香港，一些支持23條早日立法的人認為，香港已經穩定， 23條立法會得到市民的支持，不會產生任何問題。然而，持保留態度的人則認為，23條若立法，明年初台灣總統選舉將為民進黨提供另一批彈藥。從客觀的角度來看，這兩種觀點都有令人信服的論據。因此，可以預料，23條立法的時間，最終將由中央港澳工作領導小組決定，尤其是港澳工作現在歸黨中央處理。
區議員改組 重植委任制
第七，夏寶龍訪港時強調，地區事務也要堅持愛國者治港。 這樣的言論表明，正如香港傳媒報道的那樣，很有可能重新委任區議員。更重要的是，可以預料，18區區議會中，可能有不到一半的議席由直選產生。然而，尚不清楚直選議席的比例是40%抑或30%。特區政府可能會就新一屆區議會的組成發表文件；同時可以預見，部分議席將由政府委任，其中包括建制派社會賢達和積極愛國人士。
此外，地區撲滅罪行委員會（DFCC）和地區防火委員會（DFSC）的部分青年成員和地區領袖將有機會選舉自己的議員進入區議會。或者政府將委任地區撲滅罪行委員會和地區防火委員會的成員。 理想情況下，可以引入間接選舉。如果超過50%的區議會議席以委任方式產生，將令許多支持直選的港人和地區活躍人士感到失望。
無論區議會的直選議席、間選議席和委任議席的比例如何，親北京政黨和團體的反應都值得我們關注和分析，因為一些親北京政黨已經培養了一批習慣參加區議會選舉的地區政治人物。諷刺的是，委任很可能會減少一些街道層面和直選產生的政治人物返回區議會的機會。
北京珍惜 普通法制度
第八，夏寶龍關於普通法制的言論值得我們關注，因為他首次提到普通法制可以「很好地維護國家安全」。 這是中央官員首次指出普通法與香港特別行政區國家安全法的兼容性。因此，北京高層意識到保留和珍惜普通法制度，對維護香港法治和國家安全的重要性。
夏寶龍訪港恰逢香港法院法官、律師和大律師訪問北京，雙方交流有助於加深了解。更重要的是，這種相互理解，有助特區政府日後就《基本法》第23條進行立法。 事實上，夏寶龍在香港會見了一些大律師，他促請他們支持律政司司長，暗示他們也應該支持23條立法和其他與國家安全相關的互聯網法例。
與發展商保持距離
第九，夏寶龍會見了部分港商，要他們對香港有信心，相信香港的商業前景一片光明，鼓勵他們投資融入大灣區。一些傳媒指出，夏寶龍的會見，發展商相對缺席；儘管如此，在北京，中央政府強調實現「共同富裕」和縮小內地貧困差距的重要性之際，夏寶龍與香港的大型發展商保持一定距離是明智的。如果香港特區政府可能需要在未來幾年因預算赤字和財政緊張而推出更多稅制改革，與發展商保持距離是一個適當的舉動，以表明北京官員的自主權不受香港大企業的影響。
第十，是秉持「愛國者治港」原則，參觀立法會，與新當選的立法會議員進行互動交流。夏寶龍強調，香港的民主不同於西方的民主，立法會議員應通過理性的討論和審議參與政府管治。夏寶龍一如其他的中央宫員，不同意民主派從1997年主權回歸到2019年下半年的反修例事件中，在立法會表現的反對策略。夏寶龍訪港後，立法會議員開始了對大灣區的考察──此舉標誌着香港的政治精英採取對等行動，表明香港致力在經濟和社會方面與內地緊密融合。
港澳辦將展開主題教育
總的來說，夏寶龍6天的香港之行具有重要的政治意義，突出了黨中央對港澳事務的集權和新一屆領導小組對香港特別行政區的工作，因此夏寶龍有必要向黨中央作匯報。港澳辦也隸屬於第23指導組的主題教育工作，這意味着新的港澳辦必須對香港進行主題教育工作。夏夏寶龍的訪問因此觸及了年輕人。
夏寶龍強調國家安全至高無上的重要性，他想到《基本法》第 23 條立法，但留下了模糊的時間表，並由黨中央作出最終決定。他抓住了遊說一些大律師支持的機會，強調普通法與國家安全法制度的兼容性，呼籲工商界樹立信心，利用大灣區的廣闊市場。夏寶龍秉持「愛國者治港」的原則，暗示區議會將見證委任議席的回歸──問題是委任議席將在多大程度上重新注入。秉持着「愛國者治港」的原則，夏寶龍到訪立法會，標誌着中央政府寧願穩定不願混亂；寧願行政主導，不願行政立法對抗。
Xia Baolong’s visit to Hong Kong and its political implications
The six-day visit of Xia Baolong, the Director of the Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO), to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) from April 13 to 19 had very important implications for how Beijing deals with the HKSAR after the two sessions.
First, since the 70-year-old Xia remains in the office as the Director of the HKMAO, his stay means that the central government needs time to groom his successor. Most importantly, Xia visited Hong Kong immediately after the HKMAO was integrated into the party centre rather than staying in the State Council as an organ. The implication of such organizational change is that the Party at the centre recentralized the functions and work of the HKMAO instead of delegating the tasks to the State Council. The centralization of the HKMAO under the Communist Party of China (CPC) means that Xia had to visit the HKSAR immediately to report to the Party centre on the development and affairs of the HKSAR shortly after the two sessions.
Second, Xia has been appointed as the deputy group leader of the Central Hong Kong and Macau Work Leading Small Group (hereafter HKMWLSG), whose group leader is the new member of the Politburo Standing Committee, namely Ding Xuexiang. The other five deputy group leaders are Xia Baolong, the united front department head Shi Taifeng, the secretary of the central political and legal commission Chen Wenqing, the minister of public security Wang Xiaohong, and the foreign minister Qin Gang.
Although Xia is no longer a Central Committee member, the fact that he has been appointed as the deputy group leader of the HKMWLSG means that the CPC relies on the HKMAO Director to keep abreast of the updated developments of both Hong Kong and Macau. As such, his visit to the HKSAR demonstrated the Party’s deep concerns about the HKSAR’s developments. It can be expected that Xia would have to write up a report about Hong Kong to the HKMWLSG, for his visit was regarded as “an investigation and a study trip,” a typical mainland-style of study made by a high-level official from the central government to the locality for an in-depth understanding of the circumstances.
Third, the Hong Kong media have neglected an important move just three days prior to Xia’s visit to Hong Kong – he attended an educational mobilization session of the HKMAO on the implementation of the Chinese-style socialist thought in the Xi Jinping era. During the session, Xia delivered a speech saying that education is an important aspect of the Chinese-style socialism under the Xi Jinping era, and that the HKMAO staff members would have to develop the spirit of struggles, to promote the work of governing the Party strictly, and to create “an iron military” over the Hong Kong and Macau work.
Xia urged the HKMAO colleagues to conduct investigation and research, and to consolidate Party work over Hong Kong and Macau affairs. Interestingly and significantly, the newly created Central Leading Group Number 23, which is responsible for education in the entire country, had its group leader Wu Wenrong attending the meeting. Wu added that education work needed division of labour, and that it had to realize “political self-awareness and political positioning.” The presence of Wu in the meeting and the remarks of Xia pointed to the importance of education work within the HKMAO and over Hong Kong and Macau.
Fourth, related to the importance of education work over Hong Kong was Xia’s interactions with the young people in the HKSAR, including students at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and young scientists at the InnoHK Research Centre. Xia also met secondary and primary school children and his visit to schools was accompanied by Chief Executive John Lee and the Secretary for Education Choi Yuk-lin – an event showing his concern about the development of national education. He played ping pong with primary school children, asking them to study hard and treasure the valuable opportunities for their development. Obviously, youth development is one of the important agendas in his visit in conformity with the emphasis on education work during the HKMAO meeting with the participation of Wu Wenrong from Central leading Group Number 23 on April 10.
Fifth, Xia’s public speeches in the HKSAR pointed to the top priority of maintaining national security, saying that chaos was harmful to Hong Kong, that opposition is not equivalent to democracy, that parade is not the only means of expressing public demands. Obviously, from the central government’s assessment of Hong Kong, partly because the HKSAR’s Covid restrictions were just lifted about two months ago, and mainly because the HKSAR is embedded with potential elements that can destabilize the society and polity suddenly, the emphasis on the protection of national security is understandable – a stress that was in conformity with the CPC’s report on Hong Kong during the 20th Party Congress and the two sessions.
Sixth, if national security is still in command, it is natural that the legislation on Article 23 will be tabled in the Legislative Council as a matter of time. The HKSAR authorities remain ambiguous on the timeline of legislating on Article 23 – it may be in 2023 or the latest in 2024. This ambiguity is attributable to the fact that the final decision will be rested with the central government in Beijing.
Bearing in mind that the extradition bill in 2019 led to protests and violence – an event with the unintended consequence of benefitting the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s presidential elections in January 2020 – the timing of legislating on Article 23 in the HKSAR is naturally the decision of Beijing. In Hong Kong, some supporters of early enactment of Article 23 have argued that since Hong Kong is stable, legislating on Article 23 will gain mass support without any impacts. However, those who were having reservations have argued that legislating on Article 23 would give another ammunition to the DPP in the upcoming presidential campaign in Taiwan. Both perspectives have their compelling arguments, from an objective perspective. Hence, it can be anticipated that the final decision of the timing of tabling the legislation on Article 23 will be up to the HKMWLSG, especially as the work on Hong Kong and Macau is now centralized by the Party.
Seventh, Xia emphasized in his visit to Hong Kong that district administration will also need to uphold patriotic rule. Such a remark points to the strong likelihood, as reported in the Hong Kong media, that appointments will return to the District Councils. Most importantly, it can be anticipated that less than half of the seats in each of the 18 District Councils will be directly elected. It is unknown whether the percentage of directly elected portion of the seats would be 30 percent of 40 percent, however. The HKSAR government would perhaps release a document in the new composition of the District Councils. It can also be predicted that some of the seats would be appointed by the government and such appointees would include pro-establishment community elites and activists.
Moreover, some young people and district leaders from the District Fight Crime Committees (DFCC) and District Fire Safety Committees (DFSC) would have the possibility of electing their own members to District Councils. Alternatively, the government would just appoint members from the DFCC and DFSC. Ideally, indirect elections can be introduced. If over 50 percent of the seats of District Councils would be returned by appointments, the move would be disappointing to many liberal-minded Hong Kong people and district activists.
Whatever the proportion of directly elected, indirectly elected and appointed seats in District Councils, the responses from pro-Beijing political parties and groups will deserve our attention and analyses, because some pro-Beijing parties have already groomed a batch of local politicians who get used to participation in local elections. Appointments would likely and ironically reduce the chances of some street-level and directly elected politicians to return to District Councils.
Eighth, Xia’s remarks on the common-law system deserve our attention, because he mentioned for the first time that the common law system can “very well protect national security.” This is the first time a central-level official who points to the compatibility between the common law system and the national security law in the HKSAR. As such, the top-level officials in Beijing realize the importance of retaining and cherishing the common law system in its protection of the rule of law and national security in the HKSAR.
Xia’s visit to Hong Kong coincided with the visits of Hong Kong’s court judges, lawyers, and barristers to Beijing – mutual exchanges helpful to enhance deeper understanding. Most importantly, such mutual understanding would assist the HKSAR government in the process of legislating on Article 23 of the Basic Law later. In fact, Xia met some barristers in Hong Kong, and he urged them to support the Secretary for Justice, implying they should also back up the legislation of Article 23 and other security-related Internet law.
Ninth, Xia met some Hong Kong businesspeople, asking them to be confident of Hong Kong, assuring them of the rosy business prospects in the HKSAR, and encouraging them to invest in and integrate into the Greater Bay Area (GBA). Some media have pointed to the relative absence of land developers in Xia’s meetings; nevertheless, at a time when the central government in Beijing emphasizes the importance of achieving “common prosperity” and minimizing the poverty gap in the mainland, it was wise for Xia to keep a certain distance with the big land developers in the HKSAR. If the HKSAR government may need to introduce more tax reforms in the coming years due to budget deficit and financial constraints, maintaining a distance with the land developers was an appropriate move to signal the autonomy of Beijing’s officials from the influence of the big business in the HKSAR.
Tenth, upholding the principle of patriotic governance, Xia visited the Legislative Council and interacted with the newly elected legislators. He emphasized that Hong Kong’s democracy is different from the Western democracy, and that legislators should engage the government through rational discussion and deliberation. Xia as the central official rejected the oppositional tactics as displayed by the democrats in the legislature after the sovereignty transfer in 1997 to the political chaos in the latter half of 2019. Following Xia’s visit, the legislators have embarked on a visit to the Greater Bay Area – a move that signals a reciprocal move by Hong Kong’s power elite to demonstrate the HKSAR’s commitment to integrating closely with the mainland, both economically and socially.
Overall, Xia Baolong’s six-day visit to Hong Kong was politically significant. It highlighted the Party’s centralization over Hong Kong and Macau affairs and the new Leading Group’s work on the HKSAR, thereby necessitating Xia’s visit and report to the Party centre. The HKMAO is also under the education work of the Leading Group Number 23, meaning that the new office must conduct education work on Hong Kong. Xia’s visit therefore reached out to the youth.
Emphasizing the paramount importance of national security, Xia had Article 23 legislation in his mind, but leaving the timeline ambiguous and to the Party centre for its final decision. He grasped the opportunity of lobbying some barristers for support. Xia stressed the compatibility of the common law system with the national security law regime, appealing to the business sector for confidence and its need to make use of the vast market in the Greater Bay Area. Upholding the principle of patriotic rule over Hong Kong, Xia implied that District Councils would witness the return of appointed seats – the question is the extent to which appointed seats would be reinjected. Upholding the principle of patriotic rule over Hong Kong, Xia’s visit to the Legislative Council signalled the central government’s preference of stability over chaos, and of the executive-led system over a system of executive-legislative confrontations.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。原文網址：https://www.macaubusiness.com/opinion-xia-baolongs-visit-to-hong-kong-and-its-political-implications/
趙靈敏
尹瑞麟
張翠容
黃錦輝
李志強
周光蓁
周萱
常霖法師
蔡國光
黃珍妮
譚新強
車品覺