在美國眾議院議長佩洛西訪問台灣後，中國隨即發布《台灣問題與新時代中國統一事業》白皮書，其內容在短期及長期均對兩岸關係具有重要的政治含義。白皮書涵蓋了中國處理台灣問題的懷柔手法和強硬路線，是北京對佩洛西訪台的直接回應。
白皮書重申中國立場，未明言放棄武統台灣
第一點，也是白皮書最重要的訊息，就是重申中國擁有台灣主權的一貫立場。白皮書用了頗大篇幅，從歷史角度說明台灣是中國不可分割的一部分，並援引1971年10月聯合國決議，明確指出台灣是中國一個省。通過陳述歷史事實及引用聯合國決議，白皮書強調中國擁有台灣主權具備法律基礙。
第二點，白皮書着重提出兩岸實現統一後帶來的實質經濟效益，包括兩岸的經濟互動、巨額的雙邊貿易、數量龐大的內地遊客、台灣參與中國「一帶一路」倡議和中華文化復興，以及台灣民眾的經濟收益等。總而言之，經濟誘因是白皮書的主要陳述。
第三點，白皮書首次強調，如果台灣與中國大陸統一後，外國可以在台灣設立領事機構或其他官方、半官方機構，國際組織和機構可以在台灣設立辦事機構，即是說在中央政府批准下，台灣可享有更多「外交空間」。在中國設計的「一國兩制」台灣模式中，這個「外交空間」是新加入的。
第四點最受關注，也最令人擔憂，白皮書並沒有提出放棄使用武力解決台灣問題，亦沒有提到在實現統一後，台灣可以保留自己的軍隊。
綜合這兩方面研判，白皮書傳達了一個清楚訊息，就是如果台灣軍隊對大陸強行統一作出反抗，軍事衝突將無可避免。正因如此，白皮書沒有提到如果兩岸實現統一後，台灣將可保留自己的軍隊，這有別於已故中國元帥葉劍英在1981年9月提出實現兩岸和平統一的9條方針政策（簡稱葉九條）。在第三條方針政策中，葉劍英提出「國家實現統一後，台灣可作為特別行政區，享有高度的自治權，並可保留軍隊。中央政府不干預台灣地方事務。」有關台灣可保留軍隊的條文，並沒有出現在白皮書內容中，反映中國正考慮在有需要時，使用武力解決台灣問題及應對未來局勢，這可說是佩洛西訪台帶來的負面影響。
同樣令人擔憂的是，台灣領導人蔡英文在8月12日表示，面對中國大陸的「武力威脅」，她及台灣民眾希望的是「我們不挑釁、不升高衝突，但捍衛主權與國家安全，台灣絕對不退縮」。
強硬懷柔處理台灣問題，不容外部勢力干涉內政
第五點，白皮書首次明確提出，大陸與台灣統一的問題不能無限期拖延給下一代。這是一個引起憂慮的訊息，意味着如果未能和平統一，中國大陸將考慮2005年制定的《反分裂國家法》第八條所提出的，以武力實現統一，阻止「台獨」勢力分裂國家。儘管如此，白皮書亦提出兩岸對話及磋商可以分階段進行，這對台灣是利多消息，但條件是台灣當局決定與大陸展開對話。在白皮書內容中，中國糅合了強硬及懷柔手法來處理台灣問題，其意圖顯而易見。
第六點，白皮書嚴厲批評美國，狠批其以「外部勢力」干預中國內政，更指責美方為「台獨」分裂勢力撐腰打氣。佩洛西執意訪台，顯然已激怒北京政府，導致中國透過發表白皮書，闡明他們對未來處理台灣問題的立場觀點和理據。
那麼，下一步會有什麼行動呢？
可以預見，今年10月舉行的中國共產黨全國代表大會，將會就台灣議題提出明確的舉措及聲明。
在2022年3月舉行的中國人民政治協商會議中，已有政協提出制定《祖國統一法》的提案。這表示如果《統一法》日後正式實施的話，將會清晰界定北京政府對「台獨」不能容忍的紅線，而北京在什麼情況下使用武力，預料亦將會明確列出。
《反分裂國家法》第8條指出：「『台獨』分裂勢力以任何名義、任何方式造成台灣從中國分裂出去的事實，或者發生將會導致台灣從中國分裂出去的重大事變，或者和平統一的可能性完全喪失，國家得採取非和平方式及其他必要措施，捍衛國家主權和領土完整。」與此同時，「採取非和平方式及其他必要措施，由國務院、中央軍事委員會決定和組織實施，並及時向全國人民代表大會常務委員會報告。」
有傳言指在進一步研究製定《祖國統一法》時，中國政府將會明確列出台灣「分裂分子」的名單。事實上，內地傳媒已公開了一些被視為「台獨」分子的名字。
如果中國當局決定明確提出在什麼條件下，國家「得採取非和平方式及其他必要措施，捍衛國家主權和領土完整」，這將會成為處理台灣問題的紅線，屆時台灣民眾將需要注意。
國民黨敏感時刻訪陸，動機意涵引發爭議
在中國發表白表書之際，正值國民黨副主席夏立言率領代表團訪問大陸，包括到訪福建及廣東省。
夏立言在此刻訪問大陸，自然吸引公眾關注及批評。國民黨一些少壯派批評他的訪問「不合時宜」，而民進黨支持者及成員更嘲諷他恍如是向大陸「投降」的鴿子。有趣的是，國民黨內部對夏立言此行也分成兩派意見，國民黨主席朱立倫力挺夏立言訪問大陸，認為有助加強與中國政府對話，但其他一些「淺綠」的國民黨成員則表示夏立言此行「值得商榷」。
據一些國民黨成員表示，如果夏立言取消訪問大陸的話，國民黨在2022年底縣市選舉中的表現將會嚴重受挫，原因是大部分台灣選民認為中國在環台六個海域進行軍演，是一種「脅迫」行為，不利國民黨選情。換言之，如果沒有人進行斡旋以調解兩岸關係，許多台灣選民會在縣市選舉一面倒投票給民進黨。當然，這個假設仍需驗證。
有趣的是，夏立言已請辭台中市國際事務委員與市政顧問身分，強調此次訪問是個人決定。儘管夏立言訪陸惹起爭議，一些台灣政評人士稱讚他此行向中國大陸釋出善意，有助紓緩兩岸緊張關係。台灣佛光大學公共事務學系的柳金財教授表示，夏立言訪問中國大陸之旅，為兩岸打造「和平緩衝區」。
總括而言，中國大陸對台灣問題發布白皮書具有重要的政治意義。這是自1981年9月已故元帥葉劍英提出和平統一的九條方針政策以來，中國首次沒有提及在實現統一後容許台灣保留自己的軍隊，無疑傳達了一個令人擔憂的訊息，反映中國有可能準備以武力解決問題。
儘管2005年的《反分裂國家法》第九條指出：「依照本法規定採取非和平方式及其他必要措施並組織實施時，國家盡最大可能保護台灣平民和在台灣的外國人的生命財產安全和其他正當權益，減少損失」，但開戰難免帶來災難。無論如何，白皮書仍強調和平統一是優先考慮的目標，並提出如果台灣當局願意接受和平統一，台灣經濟將會受益，並將獲給予「外交空間」。
最重要的是，這是中國官方首次聲言兩岸的談判及對話可以分階段進行，對台灣民眾是一個利多消息。然而，台灣的和平及繁榮穩定，很大程度取決於執政當局，現時民進黨的策略倚重美國及西方國家支持，有可能導致災難性後果。從中國對佩洛西訪台的反應研判，兩岸關係既有危機，也存在突破困局的機遇，取決於台灣方面如何捕捉潛在的機遇。
China’s White Paper on Taiwan and its political implications
The immediate publication of a “White Paper on the Taiwan question and China’s reunification enterprise during the new era” has significant political implications for cross-strait relations in the short and long term. Specifically, the White Paper’s content reveals the combination of softline and hardline strategies adopted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the question of Taiwan’s future immediately after the highly controversial visit of Nancy Pelosi to Taipei.
First and foremost, the White Paper reiterates China’s long-standing position of its sovereignty over Taiwan. It uses a large proportion of the content to refer to Taiwan as an inseparable part of China from a historical perspective. It also cites the resolution of the United Nations in October 1971, stating that Taiwan is a province of mainland China. The utilization of historical facts internally and the UN resolution externally buttresses the legal foundation of the entire White Paper on Beijing’s sovereign position on Taiwan.
Second, the White Paper emphasizes the concrete economic benefits of Taiwan’s reunification with mainland China, including cross-strait economic interactions, the large amount of bilateral trade, the tremendous number of mainland visitors, the participation in the mainland’s Belt and Road initiatives, the rise of the Chinese cultural renaissance, and the concrete economic gains of the Taiwan people. Economic enticement remains a hallmark of the whole White Paper.
Third, the White Paper for the first time emphasizes that Taiwan, if reunified with the mainland, would be able to witness the establishment of foreign diplomatic missions and organizations, a scenario that points to more “diplomatic space” conferred by Beijing on the province of Taiwan. This kind of “diplomatic space” is new in the PRC’s design of the “Taiwan model” of “one country, two systems.”
Fourth and most interestingly but alarmingly, the White Paper does not renounce the use of military force to deal with Taiwan on the one hand, and it does not mention that Taiwan, after reunification, would retain its own military on the other hand.
Reading the two points together, the White Paper carries an implicit message that if Taiwan’s military resists any mainland’s forceful efforts of reunifying the island, military conflicts would be inevitable. As such, the White Paper does not mention that Taiwan would retain its own military in the future if both sides reunify, unlike one of the nine points of reunification as mentioned by the late Marshal Ye Jianying in September 1981. Point three of Marshal Ye’s nine-point formula said: “After the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region, and it can retain its armed forces. The Central Government will not interfere with local affairs on Taiwan.” The phrase of Taiwan retaining its armed forces is prominently missing in the White Paper, meaning that the PRC considers the use of force, if necessary, to deal with Taiwan’s question and future – a negative impact of Pelosi’s visit to Taipei.
Coincidentally but worryingly, Taiwan’s leader Tsai Ing-wen said on August 12 that in the face of the mainland’s military “intimidation,” she and the Taiwan military would rally to ward off such “intimidation.”
Fifth, the White Paper says explicitly for the first time that the issue of reunification with Taiwan cannot be transferred to the next generation indefinitely – a negative message implying that the mainland would consider a military option if the peaceful means to reunify Taiwan are exhausted, as Article 8 of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law states. As such, the White Paper remarks that cross-strait dialogue and discussion can proceed in stages – a positive message to Taiwan if the island’s authorities decide to trigger negotiation with the mainland side. The combination of hardline with softline strategies is prominent in the content of the White Paper on Taiwan’s future.
Sixth, the White Paper severely criticizes the United States for not only its “external intervention” in mainland China’s domestic affairs but also its moves to foster “separatist” activities in Taiwan. The Pelosi visit has obviously angered the PRC to such an extent that Beijing utilizes the White Paper to lay out its official perspectives and justifications for any next moves to deal with Taiwan.
What will be the next moves?
Predictably, the Party Congress in October will very likely come up with concrete measures and statements over Taiwan.
During the meeting of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in March 2022, there were a few mainland delegates mentioning the possibility of enacting a Reunification Law on Taiwan. It means that the Reunification Law, if enacted later, would likely spell out the red lines that cannot be tolerated by the central government in Beijing. Specifically, the conditions of Beijing’s use of military force would be spelt out clearly.
Article 8 of the Anti-Secession Law says: “In the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Moreover, the State Council and the Central Military Commission “shall decide on and execute the non-peaceful means and other necessary measures as provided … and shall promptly report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.”
There was a speculation that the mainland authorities would perhaps spell out who are the Taiwanese “separatists” in case of any elaboration of the Reunification Law. In fact, the mainland media have already named some of these Taiwan people in public.
If PRC authorities choose to spell out the conditions under which the Chinese state “shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” over Taiwan, they would become the red lines that the Taiwan people would have to observe.
The White Paper was published at a time when a Kuomintang (KMT) leader, namely its vice chairperson Andrew Hsia Li-yan, decided to lead a delegation to visit the mainland, including the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong.
Hsia’s visit attracted public expectations and criticisms. Some Young Turks within the KMT criticized his visit as “inappropriate,” while the supporters and members of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) ridiculed him as acting as a dove “surrendering” to the mainland. Interestingly, within the KMT, two factions emerge on Hsia’s visit. Eric Chu praised his visit as an attempt at fostering a dialogue with the mainland authorities, while some other “light green” members of the KMT said that his visit “deserves some discussions.”
According to some KMT members, if Hsia does not visit the mainland, the KMT’s electoral performance by the end of 2022 would be severely affected because most of the Taiwan voters would see the mainland’s military exercises and drills in six zones outside the island as an “intimidation” with detrimental electoral impacts on the KMT. In other words, without any go-betweens mediating between Taiwan and the mainland, many Taiwan voters would likely cast their ballots overwhelmingly in favor of the DPP candidates in the upcoming county and mayoral elections – a hypothesis remains to be tested.
Interestingly, Hsia resigned from his position as a Taipei district councilor and an adviser, emphasizing that his trip to the mainland was made on a personal basis. Despite his controversial visit, some Taiwan observers praised Hsia’s visit to the mainland as a gesture of goodwill amid tense cross-strait relations. Professor Liu Chin-tsai of the Department of Public Affairs at Taiwan’s Fo Guang University said that Hsia’s visit created “a peaceful buffer zone” between Taiwan and the mainland.
In conclusion, the White Paper published by mainland China on Taiwan is politically significant. For the first time since Marshal Ye’s nine-point formula was published in September 1981, the mainland does not mention that Taiwan would be allowed to maintain its own military after reunification – a worrying sign pointing to the preparation for a possible conflict, although Article 9 of the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 states that the Chinese state “shall exert its utmost to protect the lives, property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan civilians and foreign nationals in Taiwan” in case of “employing and executing non-peaceful means.” Nevertheless, the White Paper also emphasizes peaceful reunification as a priority, demonstrating the concrete economic benefits and “diplomatic space” to Taiwan if the island authorities opt for a peaceful reunification. Most importantly, for the first time in the PRC’s official remarks on Taiwan, the negotiation and dialogue can proceed in stages – a positive message to the Taiwan people. However, the challenge to peace and prosperity to Taiwan depends on the ruling authorities, whose current strategic calculations of relying on the US and other countries ironically appear to be a recipe for potential disaster. Judging from the PRC reactions, there will be crises and opportunities for a potential breakthrough, if and only if the Taiwan side realizes and grasps such hidden opportunities.
原刊於澳門新聞通訊社（MNA）網站，本社獲作者授權轉載。
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